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-rw-r--r--ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c185
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 185 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 88a2788b..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- *
- * File: ima_api.c
- * Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement,
- * and store_template.
- */
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-
-#include "ima.h"
-static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
-
-/*
- * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
- *
- * Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry
- * to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel,
- * and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the
- * configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement
- * entries.
- *
- * Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through
- * the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate
- * TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library
- * and is used to validate the measurement list.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
- */
-int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
- int violation, struct inode *inode)
-{
- const char *op = "add_template_measure";
- const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
- int result;
-
- memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
- entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
- entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
-
- if (!violation) {
- result = ima_calc_template_hash(entry->template_len,
- &entry->template,
- entry->digest);
- if (result < 0) {
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
- entry->template_name, op,
- audit_cause, result, 0);
- return result;
- }
- }
- result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
- return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list.
- *
- * Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values.
- * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
- * value is invalidated.
- */
-void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
- const char *op, const char *cause)
-{
- struct ima_template_entry *entry;
- int violation = 1;
- int result;
-
- /* can overflow, only indicator */
- atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
-
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!entry) {
- result = -ENOMEM;
- goto err_out;
- }
- memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
- strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
- result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
- if (result < 0)
- kfree(entry);
-err_out:
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
- op, cause, result, 0);
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
- * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
- * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
- *
- * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
- * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
- * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
- * mask: contains the permission mask
- * fsmagic: hex value
- *
- * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
- * or other error, return an error code.
-*/
-int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
-{
- int must_measure;
-
- must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
- return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
-}
-
-/*
- * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
- *
- * Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist,
- * storing the measurement and i_version in the iint.
- *
- * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
- *
- * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
- */
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file)
-{
- int result = -EEXIST;
-
- if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
- u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
-
- memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
- result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest);
- if (!result)
- iint->version = i_version;
- }
- return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * ima_store_measurement - store file measurement
- *
- * Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling
- * ima_store_template.
- *
- * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
- * but the measurement could already exist:
- * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
- * different filesystems.
- * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
- * containing the hashing info.
- *
- * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
- */
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
-{
- const char *op = "add_template_measure";
- const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
- int result = -ENOMEM;
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
- struct ima_template_entry *entry;
- int violation = 0;
-
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!entry) {
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
- op, audit_cause, result, 0);
- return;
- }
- memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
- memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
- strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
-
- result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
- if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
- iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
- if (result < 0)
- kfree(entry);
-}