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authorSrikant Patnaik2015-01-11 12:28:04 +0530
committerSrikant Patnaik2015-01-11 12:28:04 +0530
commit871480933a1c28f8a9fed4c4d34d06c439a7a422 (patch)
tree8718f573808810c2a1e8cb8fb6ac469093ca2784 /ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
parent9d40ac5867b9aefe0722bc1f110b965ff294d30d (diff)
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Moved, renamed, and deleted files
The original directory structure was scattered and unorganized. Changes are basically to make it look like kernel structure.
Diffstat (limited to 'ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c')
-rw-r--r--ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c241
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 241 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 1eff5cb0..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Authors:
- * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
- * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
- * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
- * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- *
- * File: ima_main.c
- * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
- * and ima_file_check.
- */
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/file.h>
-#include <linux/binfmts.h>
-#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/mman.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
-
-#include "ima.h"
-
-int ima_initialized;
-
-char *ima_hash = "sha1";
-static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
-{
- if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
- ima_hash = "md5";
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
-
-/*
- * ima_rdwr_violation_check
- *
- * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
- * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- * could result in a file measurement error.
- *
- */
-static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
-{
- struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
- struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
- int rc;
- bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
-
- if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
- return;
-
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
-
- if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
- if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
- send_tomtou = true;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto out;
-
- if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
- send_writers = true;
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-
- if (send_tomtou)
- ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
- "ToMToU");
- if (send_writers)
- ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
- "open_writers");
-}
-
-static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct inode *inode,
- struct file *file)
-{
- fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
-
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
- atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
- iint->version != inode->i_version)
- iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
- * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
- *
- * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
- */
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
-{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-
- if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return;
-
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
- if (!iint)
- return;
-
- ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
-}
-
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- int mask, int function)
-{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- int rc = 0;
-
- if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return 0;
-
- rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-retry:
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
- if (!iint) {
- rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode);
- if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST)
- goto retry;
- return rc;
- }
-
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-
- rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
- if (rc != 0)
- goto out;
-
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
- if (!rc)
- ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
- *
- * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
- * policy decision.
- *
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
- */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
-{
- int rc;
-
- if (!file)
- return 0;
- if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
- rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
- MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
- *
- * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
- * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
- * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
- * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
- * what is being executed.
- *
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
- */
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- int rc;
-
- rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
- * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
- *
- * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
- *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
- */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
-{
- int rc;
-
- ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
- rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
- mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
- FILE_CHECK);
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
-
-static int __init init_ima(void)
-{
- int error;
-
- error = ima_init();
- ima_initialized = 1;
- return error;
-}
-
-static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
-{
- ima_cleanup();
-}
-
-late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
-
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");