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authorSrikant Patnaik2015-01-11 12:28:04 +0530
committerSrikant Patnaik2015-01-11 12:28:04 +0530
commit871480933a1c28f8a9fed4c4d34d06c439a7a422 (patch)
tree8718f573808810c2a1e8cb8fb6ac469093ca2784 /ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
parent9d40ac5867b9aefe0722bc1f110b965ff294d30d (diff)
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Moved, renamed, and deleted files
The original directory structure was scattered and unorganized. Changes are basically to make it look like kernel structure.
Diffstat (limited to 'ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c')
-rw-r--r--ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c257
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 257 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 49a464f5..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Authors:
- * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
- * File: evm_crypto.c
- * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <linux/xattr.h>
-#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include "evm.h"
-
-#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
-#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
-static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
-static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
-
-struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
-struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
-
-static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
-{
- long rc;
- char *algo;
- struct crypto_shash **tfm;
- struct shash_desc *desc;
-
- if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
- tfm = &hmac_tfm;
- algo = evm_hmac;
- } else {
- tfm = &hash_tfm;
- algo = evm_hash;
- }
-
- if (*tfm == NULL) {
- mutex_lock(&mutex);
- if (*tfm)
- goto out;
- *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
- rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
- pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
- *tfm = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&mutex);
- return ERR_PTR(rc);
- }
- if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
- rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
- if (rc) {
- crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
- *tfm = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&mutex);
- return ERR_PTR(rc);
- }
- }
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&mutex);
- }
-
- desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!desc)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
- desc->tfm = *tfm;
- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-
- rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (rc) {
- kfree(desc);
- return ERR_PTR(rc);
- }
- return desc;
-}
-
-/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
- * specific info.
- *
- * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
- * protection.)
- */
-static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
- char *digest)
-{
- struct h_misc {
- unsigned long ino;
- __u32 generation;
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
- umode_t mode;
- } hmac_misc;
-
- memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
- hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
- hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
- hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid;
- hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid;
- hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
- crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
- crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
- *
- * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
- * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
- * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
- */
-static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *req_xattr_name,
- const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len,
- char type, char *digest)
-{
- struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- struct shash_desc *desc;
- char **xattrname;
- size_t xattr_size = 0;
- char *xattr_value = NULL;
- int error;
- int size;
-
- if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- desc = init_desc(type);
- if (IS_ERR(desc))
- return PTR_ERR(desc);
-
- error = -ENODATA;
- for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
- if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
- && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
- error = 0;
- crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len);
- continue;
- }
- size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
- &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
- if (size == -ENOMEM) {
- error = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- if (size < 0)
- continue;
-
- error = 0;
- xattr_size = size;
- crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
- }
- hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest);
-
-out:
- kfree(xattr_value);
- kfree(desc);
- return error;
-}
-
-int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
- const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
- char *digest)
-{
- return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
-}
-
-int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
- const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
- char *digest)
-{
- return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
- *
- * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
- */
-int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
- const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
-{
- struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
- int rc = 0;
-
- rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
- if (rc == 0) {
- xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
- rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
- &xattr_data,
- sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
- }
- else if (rc == -ENODATA)
- rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
- return rc;
-}
-
-int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
- char *hmac_val)
-{
- struct shash_desc *desc;
-
- desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
- if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(desc);
- }
-
- crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
- hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val);
- kfree(desc);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
- */
-int evm_init_key(void)
-{
- struct key *evm_key;
- struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
- int rc = 0;
-
- evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
- return -ENOENT;
-
- down_read(&evm_key->sem);
- ekp = evm_key->payload.data;
- if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
-out:
- /* burn the original key contents */
- memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
- up_read(&evm_key->sem);
- key_put(evm_key);
- return rc;
-}