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authorSrikant Patnaik2015-01-11 12:28:04 +0530
committerSrikant Patnaik2015-01-11 12:28:04 +0530
commit871480933a1c28f8a9fed4c4d34d06c439a7a422 (patch)
tree8718f573808810c2a1e8cb8fb6ac469093ca2784 /ANDROID_3.4.5/security/apparmor/domain.c
parent9d40ac5867b9aefe0722bc1f110b965ff294d30d (diff)
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Moved, renamed, and deleted files
The original directory structure was scattered and unorganized. Changes are basically to make it look like kernel structure.
Diffstat (limited to 'ANDROID_3.4.5/security/apparmor/domain.c')
-rw-r--r--ANDROID_3.4.5/security/apparmor/domain.c823
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 823 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/apparmor/domain.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/apparmor/domain.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6327685c..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,823 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * AppArmor security module
- *
- * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- */
-
-#include <linux/errno.h>
-#include <linux/fdtable.h>
-#include <linux/file.h>
-#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/syscalls.h>
-#include <linux/tracehook.h>
-#include <linux/personality.h>
-
-#include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
-#include "include/domain.h"
-#include "include/file.h"
-#include "include/ipc.h"
-#include "include/match.h"
-#include "include/path.h"
-#include "include/policy.h"
-
-/**
- * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table
- * @domain: the domain table to free (MAYBE NULL)
- */
-void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
-{
- int i;
- if (domain) {
- if (!domain->table)
- return;
-
- for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
- kzfree(domain->table[i]);
- kzfree(domain->table);
- domain->table = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
- * @task: task we want to change profile of (NOT NULL)
- * @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
- * to trace the new domain
- *
- * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
- */
-static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
- struct aa_profile *to_profile)
-{
- struct task_struct *tracer;
- const struct cred *cred = NULL;
- struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
- int error = 0;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
- if (tracer) {
- /* released below */
- cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
- tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred);
- }
-
- /* not ptraced */
- if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
- goto out;
-
- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
-
-out:
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (cred)
- put_cred(cred);
-
- return error;
-}
-
-/**
- * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile
- * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL)
- * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL)
- * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL)
- * @request: requested perms
- * @start: state to start matching in
- *
- * Returns: permission set
- */
-static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
- struct aa_namespace *ns,
- const char *name, u32 request,
- unsigned int start)
-{
- struct file_perms perms;
- struct path_cond cond = { };
- unsigned int state;
-
- if (unconfined(profile)) {
- perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
- perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0;
- return perms;
- } else if (!profile->file.dfa) {
- return nullperms;
- } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) {
- /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */
- aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms);
- if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request)
- return perms;
- }
-
- /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
- state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name);
- state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
- aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
-
- return perms;
-}
-
-/**
- * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match
- * @name - to match against (NOT NULL)
- * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching
- * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
- * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
- * xmatch_len are preferred.
- *
- * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held
- *
- * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
- */
-static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
- struct list_head *head)
-{
- int len = 0;
- struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
-
- list_for_each_entry(profile, head, base.list) {
- if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL)
- continue;
- if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) {
- unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
- DFA_START, name);
- u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
- /* any accepting state means a valid match. */
- if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
- candidate = profile;
- len = profile->xmatch_len;
- }
- } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
- /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
- return profile;
- }
-
- return candidate;
-}
-
-/**
- * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
- * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL)
- * @list: list to search (NOT NULL)
- * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
- */
-static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns,
- struct list_head *list, const char *name)
-{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
-
- read_lock(&ns->lock);
- profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list));
- read_unlock(&ns->lock);
-
- return profile;
-}
-
-/**
- * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names
- * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL)
- * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL)
- *
- * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the
- * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a :
- * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and
- * isn't re-split on every lookup.
- *
- * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace
- * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results
- * in the following possible encodings:
- * profile_name\0
- * :ns_name\0profile_name\0
- * :ns_name\0\0
- *
- * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table
- *
- * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL
- */
-static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name)
-{
- const char *name;
-
- if (fqname[0] == ':') {
- /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators
- * in the string. They are verified at load time by
- * by unpack_trans_table
- */
- *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */
- name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1;
- if (!*name)
- name = NULL;
- } else {
- *ns_name = NULL;
- name = fqname;
- }
-
- return name;
-}
-
-static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table
- * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
- * @xindex: index into x transition table
- *
- * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
- */
-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
-{
- struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
- struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
- u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
- int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
- const char *name;
-
- /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */
- for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name;
- name = next_name(xtype, name)) {
- struct aa_namespace *new_ns;
- const char *xname = NULL;
-
- new_ns = NULL;
- if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
- /* release by caller */
- new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name);
- continue;
- } else if (*name == ':') {
- /* switching namespace */
- const char *ns_name;
- xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name);
- if (!xname)
- /* no name so use profile name */
- xname = profile->base.hname;
- if (*ns_name == '@') {
- /* TODO: variable support */
- ;
- }
- /* released below */
- new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name);
- if (!new_ns)
- continue;
- } else if (*name == '@') {
- /* TODO: variable support */
- continue;
- } else {
- /* basic namespace lookup */
- xname = name;
- }
-
- /* released by caller */
- new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname);
- aa_put_namespace(new_ns);
- }
-
- /* released by caller */
- return new_profile;
-}
-
-/**
- * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex
- * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
- * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
- * @xindex: index into x transition table
- *
- * find profile for a transition index
- *
- * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available
- */
-static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
- const char *name, u32 xindex)
-{
- struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
- struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
- u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
-
- switch (xtype) {
- case AA_X_NONE:
- /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
- return NULL;
- case AA_X_NAME:
- if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
- /* released by caller */
- new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles,
- name);
- else
- /* released by caller */
- new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles,
- name);
- break;
- case AA_X_TABLE:
- /* released by caller */
- new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex);
- break;
- }
-
- /* released by caller */
- return new_profile;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct
- * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: %0 or error on failure
- */
-int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
- struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL;
- struct aa_namespace *ns;
- char *buffer = NULL;
- unsigned int state;
- struct file_perms perms = {};
- struct path_cond cond = {
- bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
- bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
- };
- const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
- int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
- if (error)
- return error;
-
- if (bprm->cred_prepared)
- return 0;
-
- cxt = bprm->cred->security;
- BUG_ON(!cxt);
-
- profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile));
- /*
- * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement
- * can change the namespace
- */
- ns = profile->ns;
- state = profile->file.start;
-
- /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
- error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
- &name, &info);
- if (error) {
- if (profile->flags &
- (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED))
- error = 0;
- name = bprm->filename;
- goto audit;
- }
-
- /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other
- * x transitions.
- */
- if (unconfined(profile)) {
- /* unconfined task */
- if (cxt->onexec)
- /* change_profile on exec already been granted */
- new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec);
- else
- new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
- if (!new_profile)
- goto cleanup;
- goto apply;
- }
-
- /* find exec permissions for name */
- state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
- if (cxt->onexec) {
- struct file_perms cp;
- info = "change_profile onexec";
- if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
- goto audit;
-
- /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec.
- * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
- * exec\0change_profile
- */
- state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
- cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns,
- cxt->onexec->base.name,
- AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state);
-
- if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
- goto audit;
- new_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec));
- goto apply;
- }
-
- if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
- /* exec permission determine how to transition */
- new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex);
- if (!new_profile) {
- if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
- /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
- * use the newest version, which was picked
- * up above when getting profile
- */
- info = "ix fallback";
- new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
- goto x_clear;
- } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
- new_profile = aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined);
- info = "ux fallback";
- } else {
- error = -ENOENT;
- info = "profile not found";
- }
- }
- } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
- /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */
- new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
- if (!new_profile) {
- error = -ENOMEM;
- info = "could not create null profile";
- } else {
- error = -EACCES;
- target = new_profile->base.hname;
- }
- perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
- } else
- /* fail exec */
- error = -EACCES;
-
- if (!new_profile)
- goto audit;
-
- if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
- /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
- ;
- }
-
- if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile);
- if (error) {
- aa_put_profile(new_profile);
- goto audit;
- }
- }
-
- /* Determine if secure exec is needed.
- * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
- * 1. unconfined switching to confined
- * 2. confined switching to different confinement
- * 3. confined switching to unconfined
- *
- * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
- * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
- *
- * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
- * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
- */
- if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
- AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
- name, new_profile->base.hname);
- bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
- }
-apply:
- target = new_profile->base.hname;
- /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
- bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-
-x_clear:
- aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
- /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
- cxt->profile = new_profile;
-
- /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
- aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
- aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
- cxt->previous = NULL;
- cxt->onexec = NULL;
- cxt->token = 0;
-
-audit:
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
- name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
-
-cleanup:
- aa_put_profile(profile);
- kfree(buffer);
-
- return error;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
- * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
- */
-int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
-
- /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
- * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
- */
- if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
- ret = 1;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
- * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
- */
-void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
- struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
-
- /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
- if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
- (unconfined(new_cxt->profile)))
- return;
-
- current->pdeath_signal = 0;
-
- /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */
- __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile);
-}
-
-/**
- * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
- * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
- */
-void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
- return;
-}
-
-/*
- * Functions for self directed profile change
- */
-
-/**
- * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1
- * @n1: base of hname (NOT NULL)
- * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: new name or NULL on error
- */
-static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
-{
- char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (name)
- sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
- return name;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
- * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0)
- * @count: number of hat names in @hats
- * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
- * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
- *
- * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store
- * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the
- * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the
- * top level profile.
- *
- * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
- */
-int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
-{
- const struct cred *cred;
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
- struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL;
- char *name = NULL;
- int i;
- struct file_perms perms = {};
- const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
- int error = 0;
-
- /* released below */
- cred = get_current_cred();
- cxt = cred->security;
- profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
- previous_profile = cxt->previous;
-
- if (unconfined(profile)) {
- info = "unconfined";
- error = -EPERM;
- goto audit;
- }
-
- if (count) {
- /* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */
- struct aa_profile *root;
- root = PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile) ? profile->parent : profile;
-
- /* find first matching hat */
- for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++)
- /* released below */
- hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]);
- if (!hat) {
- if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) {
- if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles))
- error = -ECHILD;
- else
- error = -ENOENT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /*
- * In complain mode and failed to match any hats.
- * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat
- * supplied. This is done due how userspace
- * interacts with change_hat.
- *
- * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats
- */
-
- /* freed below */
- name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]);
- target = name;
- /* released below */
- hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1);
- if (!hat) {
- info = "failed null profile create";
- error = -ENOMEM;
- goto audit;
- }
- } else {
- target = hat->base.hname;
- if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
- info = "target not hat";
- error = -EPERM;
- goto audit;
- }
- }
-
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat);
- if (error) {
- info = "ptraced";
- error = -EPERM;
- goto audit;
- }
-
- if (!permtest) {
- error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token);
- if (error == -EACCES)
- /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
- perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
- else if (name && !error)
- /* reset error for learning of new hats */
- error = -ENOENT;
- }
- } else if (previous_profile) {
- /* Return to saved profile. Kill task if restore fails
- * to avoid brute force attacks
- */
- target = previous_profile->base.hname;
- error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token);
- perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
- } else
- /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
- goto out;
-
-audit:
- if (!permtest)
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL,
- OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL,
- target, 0, info, error);
-
-out:
- aa_put_profile(hat);
- kfree(name);
- put_cred(cred);
-
- return error;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
- * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL)
- * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL)
- * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec
- * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
- *
- * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way
- * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is
- * used.
- * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
- * the next exec.
- *
- * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
- */
-int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
- bool permtest)
-{
- const struct cred *cred;
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
- struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
- struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
- struct file_perms perms = {};
- const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
- int op, error = 0;
- u32 request;
-
- if (!hname && !ns_name)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (onexec) {
- request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
- op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC;
- } else {
- request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
- op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
- }
-
- cred = get_current_cred();
- cxt = cred->security;
- profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
-
- if (ns_name) {
- /* released below */
- ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
- if (!ns) {
- /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */
- name = ns_name;
- info = "namespace not found";
- error = -ENOENT;
- goto audit;
- }
- } else
- /* released below */
- ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns);
-
- /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */
- if (!hname) {
- if (unconfined(profile))
- hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname;
- else
- hname = profile->base.hname;
- }
-
- perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request,
- profile->file.start);
- if (!(perms.allow & request)) {
- error = -EACCES;
- goto audit;
- }
-
- /* released below */
- target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname);
- if (!target) {
- info = "profile not found";
- error = -ENOENT;
- if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
- goto audit;
- /* released below */
- target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
- if (!target) {
- info = "failed null profile create";
- error = -ENOMEM;
- goto audit;
- }
- }
-
- /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
- error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target);
- if (error) {
- info = "ptrace prevents transition";
- goto audit;
- }
-
- if (permtest)
- goto audit;
-
- if (onexec)
- error = aa_set_current_onexec(target);
- else
- error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
-
-audit:
- if (!permtest)
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request,
- name, hname, 0, info, error);
-
- aa_put_namespace(ns);
- aa_put_profile(target);
- put_cred(cred);
-
- return error;
-}