From a1e0a5502f04da68b6a9ca8508dda3f9d7e1d055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: coderick14
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 15:40:18 +0530
Subject: Upgrade to Django 1.11
- Database integration yet to be tested
---
.../site-packages/django/middleware/csrf.py | 208 ---------------------
1 file changed, 208 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 lib/python2.7/site-packages/django/middleware/csrf.py
(limited to 'lib/python2.7/site-packages/django/middleware/csrf.py')
diff --git a/lib/python2.7/site-packages/django/middleware/csrf.py b/lib/python2.7/site-packages/django/middleware/csrf.py
deleted file mode 100644
index 1089153..0000000
--- a/lib/python2.7/site-packages/django/middleware/csrf.py
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-"""
-Cross Site Request Forgery Middleware.
-
-This module provides a middleware that implements protection
-against request forgeries from other sites.
-"""
-from __future__ import unicode_literals
-
-import logging
-import re
-
-from django.conf import settings
-from django.core.urlresolvers import get_callable
-from django.utils.cache import patch_vary_headers
-from django.utils.encoding import force_text
-from django.utils.http import same_origin
-from django.utils.crypto import constant_time_compare, get_random_string
-
-
-logger = logging.getLogger('django.request')
-
-REASON_NO_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - no Referer."
-REASON_BAD_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - %s does not match %s."
-REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE = "CSRF cookie not set."
-REASON_BAD_TOKEN = "CSRF token missing or incorrect."
-
-CSRF_KEY_LENGTH = 32
-
-def _get_failure_view():
- """
- Returns the view to be used for CSRF rejections
- """
- return get_callable(settings.CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW)
-
-
-def _get_new_csrf_key():
- return get_random_string(CSRF_KEY_LENGTH)
-
-
-def get_token(request):
- """
- Returns the CSRF token required for a POST form. The token is an
- alphanumeric value.
-
- A side effect of calling this function is to make the csrf_protect
- decorator and the CsrfViewMiddleware add a CSRF cookie and a 'Vary: Cookie'
- header to the outgoing response. For this reason, you may need to use this
- function lazily, as is done by the csrf context processor.
- """
- request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_USED"] = True
- return request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE", None)
-
-
-def rotate_token(request):
- """
- Changes the CSRF token in use for a request - should be done on login
- for security purposes.
- """
- request.META.update({
- "CSRF_COOKIE_USED": True,
- "CSRF_COOKIE": _get_new_csrf_key(),
- })
-
-
-def _sanitize_token(token):
- # Allow only alphanum
- if len(token) > CSRF_KEY_LENGTH:
- return _get_new_csrf_key()
- token = re.sub('[^a-zA-Z0-9]+', '', force_text(token))
- if token == "":
- # In case the cookie has been truncated to nothing at some point.
- return _get_new_csrf_key()
- return token
-
-
-class CsrfViewMiddleware(object):
- """
- Middleware that requires a present and correct csrfmiddlewaretoken
- for POST requests that have a CSRF cookie, and sets an outgoing
- CSRF cookie.
-
- This middleware should be used in conjunction with the csrf_token template
- tag.
- """
- # The _accept and _reject methods currently only exist for the sake of the
- # requires_csrf_token decorator.
- def _accept(self, request):
- # Avoid checking the request twice by adding a custom attribute to
- # request. This will be relevant when both decorator and middleware
- # are used.
- request.csrf_processing_done = True
- return None
-
- def _reject(self, request, reason):
- logger.warning('Forbidden (%s): %s',
- reason, request.path,
- extra={
- 'status_code': 403,
- 'request': request,
- }
- )
- return _get_failure_view()(request, reason=reason)
-
- def process_view(self, request, callback, callback_args, callback_kwargs):
-
- if getattr(request, 'csrf_processing_done', False):
- return None
-
- try:
- csrf_token = _sanitize_token(
- request.COOKIES[settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME])
- # Use same token next time
- request.META['CSRF_COOKIE'] = csrf_token
- except KeyError:
- csrf_token = None
- # Generate token and store it in the request, so it's
- # available to the view.
- request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] = _get_new_csrf_key()
-
- # Wait until request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] has been manipulated before
- # bailing out, so that get_token still works
- if getattr(callback, 'csrf_exempt', False):
- return None
-
- # Assume that anything not defined as 'safe' by RFC2616 needs protection
- if request.method not in ('GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS', 'TRACE'):
- if getattr(request, '_dont_enforce_csrf_checks', False):
- # Mechanism to turn off CSRF checks for test suite.
- # It comes after the creation of CSRF cookies, so that
- # everything else continues to work exactly the same
- # (e.g. cookies are sent, etc.), but before any
- # branches that call reject().
- return self._accept(request)
-
- if request.is_secure():
- # Suppose user visits http://example.com/
- # An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a
- # POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and
- # submits it via JavaScript.
- #
- # The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but
- # that's no problem for a MITM and the session-independent
- # nonce we're using. So the MITM can circumvent the CSRF
- # protection. This is true for any HTTP connection, but anyone
- # using HTTPS expects better! For this reason, for
- # https://example.com/ we need additional protection that treats
- # http://example.com/ as completely untrusted. Under HTTPS,
- # Barth et al. found that the Referer header is missing for
- # same-domain requests in only about 0.2% of cases or less, so
- # we can use strict Referer checking.
- referer = request.META.get('HTTP_REFERER')
- if referer is None:
- return self._reject(request, REASON_NO_REFERER)
-
- # Note that request.get_host() includes the port.
- good_referer = 'https://%s/' % request.get_host()
- if not same_origin(referer, good_referer):
- reason = REASON_BAD_REFERER % (referer, good_referer)
- return self._reject(request, reason)
-
- if csrf_token is None:
- # No CSRF cookie. For POST requests, we insist on a CSRF cookie,
- # and in this way we can avoid all CSRF attacks, including login
- # CSRF.
- return self._reject(request, REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE)
-
- # Check non-cookie token for match.
- request_csrf_token = ""
- if request.method == "POST":
- request_csrf_token = request.POST.get('csrfmiddlewaretoken', '')
-
- if request_csrf_token == "":
- # Fall back to X-CSRFToken, to make things easier for AJAX,
- # and possible for PUT/DELETE.
- request_csrf_token = request.META.get('HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN', '')
-
- if not constant_time_compare(request_csrf_token, csrf_token):
- return self._reject(request, REASON_BAD_TOKEN)
-
- return self._accept(request)
-
- def process_response(self, request, response):
- if getattr(response, 'csrf_processing_done', False):
- return response
-
- # If CSRF_COOKIE is unset, then CsrfViewMiddleware.process_view was
- # never called, probaby because a request middleware returned a response
- # (for example, contrib.auth redirecting to a login page).
- if request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE") is None:
- return response
-
- if not request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE_USED", False):
- return response
-
- # Set the CSRF cookie even if it's already set, so we renew
- # the expiry timer.
- response.set_cookie(settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME,
- request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"],
- max_age = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 52,
- domain=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN,
- path=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_PATH,
- secure=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE,
- httponly=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY
- )
- # Content varies with the CSRF cookie, so set the Vary header.
- patch_vary_headers(response, ('Cookie',))
- response.csrf_processing_done = True
- return response
--
cgit