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Diffstat (limited to 'ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/xfrm.c')
-rw-r--r--ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/xfrm.c490
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 490 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/xfrm.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 48665ecd..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,490 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
- *
- * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
- *
- * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
- * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
- *
- * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
- * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- */
-
-/*
- * USAGE:
- * NOTES:
- * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
- * CONFIG_SECURITY=y
- * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
- * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
- * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
- * ISSUES:
- * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
- * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
- * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
- */
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/ip.h>
-#include <linux/tcp.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <linux/xfrm.h>
-#include <net/xfrm.h>
-#include <net/checksum.h>
-#include <net/udp.h>
-#include <linux/atomic.h>
-
-#include "avc.h"
-#include "objsec.h"
-#include "xfrm.h"
-
-/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */
-atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
-/*
- * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
- */
-static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
-{
- return (ctx &&
- (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
- (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
- */
-static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
-{
- return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
- * a xfrm policy rule.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
-{
- int rc;
- u32 sel_sid;
-
- /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
- if (ctx) {
- if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- } else
- /*
- * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
- * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
- * would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
- */
- return 0;
-
- rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
- NULL);
-
- if (rc == -EACCES)
- return -ESRCH;
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
- * the given policy, flow combo.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- const struct flowi *fl)
-{
- u32 state_sid;
- int rc;
-
- if (!xp->security)
- if (x->security)
- /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
- return 0;
- else
- /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
- return 1;
- else
- if (!x->security)
- /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
- return 0;
- else
- if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
- /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
- return 0;
-
- state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
-
- if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
- return 0;
-
- rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
- NULL)? 0:1;
-
- /*
- * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
- * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
- * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
- * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
- */
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
- * incoming packet.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
-{
- struct sec_path *sp;
-
- *sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
- if (skb == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- sp = skb->sp;
- if (sp) {
- int i, sid_set = 0;
-
- for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
- if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-
- if (!sid_set) {
- *sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- sid_set = 1;
-
- if (!ckall)
- break;
- } else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
- * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
- */
-static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
-{
- int rc = 0;
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
- char *ctx_str = NULL;
- u32 str_len;
-
- BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
-
- if (!uctx)
- goto not_from_user;
-
- if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
- if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
- str_len + 1,
- GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
- ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
- ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
-
- memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
- uctx+1,
- str_len);
- ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0;
- rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
- str_len,
- &ctx->ctx_sid);
-
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- /*
- * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
- */
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
- SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- return rc;
-
-not_from_user:
- rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
- str_len,
- GFP_ATOMIC);
-
- if (!ctx) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
- ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
- ctx->ctx_sid = sid;
- ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
- memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
- ctx_str,
- str_len);
-
- goto out2;
-
-out:
- *ctxp = NULL;
- kfree(ctx);
-out2:
- kfree(ctx_str);
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
- * xfrm_policy.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
-{
- int err;
-
- BUG_ON(!uctx);
-
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0);
- if (err == 0)
- atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-
- return err;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
- * new for policy cloning.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
-{
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
-
- if (old_ctx) {
- new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!new_ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
- memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
- *new_ctxp = new_ctx;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
- */
-void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
-{
- kfree(ctx);
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
-{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
- int rc = 0;
-
- if (ctx) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
- SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
- if (rc == 0)
- atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
- * xfrm_state.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
- u32 secid)
-{
- int err;
-
- BUG_ON(!x);
-
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
- if (err == 0)
- atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
- return err;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
- */
-void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
-{
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- kfree(ctx);
-}
-
- /*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
-{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- int rc = 0;
-
- if (ctx) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
- SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
- if (rc == 0)
- atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
- * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
- * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then
- * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
- * gone thru the IPSec process.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct common_audit_data *ad)
-{
- int i, rc = 0;
- struct sec_path *sp;
- u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-
- sp = skb->sp;
-
- if (sp) {
- for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
-
- if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * This check even when there's no association involved is
- * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
- * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
- * explicitly allowed by policy.
- */
-
- rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
- * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
- * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
- * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
- * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
-{
- struct dst_entry *dst;
- int rc = 0;
-
- dst = skb_dst(skb);
-
- if (dst) {
- struct dst_entry *dst_test;
-
- for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL;
- dst_test = dst_test->child) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
-
- if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- switch (proto) {
- case IPPROTO_AH:
- case IPPROTO_ESP:
- case IPPROTO_COMP:
- /*
- * We should have already seen this packet once before
- * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
- * unlabeled check.
- */
- goto out;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * This check even when there's no association involved is
- * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
- * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
- * explicitly allowed by policy.
- */
-
- rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
- ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
-out:
- return rc;
-}
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-01-24 16:50:20 +0000