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-rw-r--r--ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/avc.c886
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 886 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/avc.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/avc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8ee42b2a..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,886 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
- *
- * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
- * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
- *
- * Update: KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
- * Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- */
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/stddef.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/dcache.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <net/sock.h>
-#include <linux/un.h>
-#include <net/af_unix.h>
-#include <linux/ip.h>
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/ipv6.h>
-#include <net/ipv6.h>
-#include "avc.h"
-#include "avc_ss.h"
-#include "classmap.h"
-
-#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512
-#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512
-#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
-#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field)
-#else
-#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) do {} while (0)
-#endif
-
-struct avc_entry {
- u32 ssid;
- u32 tsid;
- u16 tclass;
- struct av_decision avd;
-};
-
-struct avc_node {
- struct avc_entry ae;
- struct hlist_node list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
- struct rcu_head rhead;
-};
-
-struct avc_cache {
- struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
- spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
- atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
- atomic_t active_nodes;
- u32 latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */
-};
-
-struct avc_callback_node {
- int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms,
- u32 *out_retained);
- u32 events;
- u32 ssid;
- u32 tsid;
- u16 tclass;
- u32 perms;
- struct avc_callback_node *next;
-};
-
-/* Exported via selinufs */
-unsigned int avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
-#endif
-
-static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
-static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
-static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
-
-static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
-{
- return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_dump_av - Display an access vector in human-readable form.
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @av: access vector
- */
-static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
-{
- const char **perms;
- int i, perm;
-
- if (av == 0) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " null");
- return;
- }
-
- perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " {");
- i = 0;
- perm = 1;
- while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
- if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
- av &= ~perm;
- }
- i++;
- perm <<= 1;
- }
-
- if (av)
- audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " }");
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- */
-static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
-{
- int rc;
- char *scontext;
- u32 scontext_len;
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
- if (rc)
- audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
- else {
- audit_log_format(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
- kfree(scontext);
- }
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
- if (rc)
- audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
- else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
- kfree(scontext);
- }
-
- BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
- audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
- *
- * Initialize the access vector cache.
- */
-void __init avc_init(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
- INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
- spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
- }
- atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
- atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
-
- avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
-
- audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
-}
-
-int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
-{
- int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
- struct avc_node *node;
- struct hlist_head *head;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
-
- slots_used = 0;
- max_chain_len = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
- head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
- if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
- struct hlist_node *next;
-
- slots_used++;
- chain_len = 0;
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
- chain_len++;
- if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
- max_chain_len = chain_len;
- }
- }
-
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
- return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
- "longest chain: %d\n",
- atomic_read(&avc_cache.active_nodes),
- slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
-}
-
-static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
-{
- struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
- kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
- avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
-}
-
-static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
-{
- hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
- call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
- atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
-}
-
-static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
-{
- kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
- avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
- atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
-}
-
-static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
-{
- hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
- call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
- atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
-}
-
-static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
-{
- struct avc_node *node;
- int hvalue, try, ecx;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
- spinlock_t *lock;
-
- for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
- hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
- head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
- lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
-
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
- continue;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) {
- avc_node_delete(node);
- avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
- ecx++;
- if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
- }
-out:
- return ecx;
-}
-
-static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
-{
- struct avc_node *node;
-
- node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!node)
- goto out;
-
- INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
- avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
-
- if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
- avc_reclaim_node();
-
-out:
- return node;
-}
-
-static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
-{
- node->ae.ssid = ssid;
- node->ae.tsid = tsid;
- node->ae.tclass = tclass;
- memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
-}
-
-static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
-{
- struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
- int hvalue;
- struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
-
- hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) {
- if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
- tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
- tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
- ret = node;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- *
- * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
- * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
- * based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists,
- * then this function returns the avc_node.
- * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
- */
-static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
-{
- struct avc_node *node;
-
- avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
- node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-
- if (node)
- return node;
-
- avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
- unsigned long flag;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
- if (is_insert) {
- if (seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
- seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif);
- ret = -EAGAIN;
- }
- } else {
- if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif)
- avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @avd: resulting av decision
- *
- * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
- * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
- * The access vectors and the sequence number are
- * normally provided by the security server in
- * response to a security_compute_av() call. If the
- * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
- * revocation notification, then the function copies
- * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
- * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
- */
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
-{
- struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
- int hvalue;
- unsigned long flag;
-
- if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
- goto out;
-
- node = avc_alloc_node();
- if (node) {
- struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
- spinlock_t *lock;
-
- hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-
- head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
- lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
- hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
- if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
- pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
- pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
- avc_node_replace(node, pos);
- goto found;
- }
- }
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
-found:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
- }
-out:
- return node;
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
- * will be called by generic audit code
- * @ab: the audit buffer
- * @a: audit_data
- */
-static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
-{
- struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
- audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ",
- ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
- avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass,
- ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->audited);
- audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
- * will be called by generic audit code
- * @ab: the audit buffer
- * @a: audit_data
- */
-static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
-{
- struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
- audit_log_format(ab, " ");
- avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->ssid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tsid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass);
-}
-
-/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
-static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
- struct common_audit_data *a,
- unsigned flags)
-{
- struct common_audit_data stack_data;
- struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
- struct selinux_late_audit_data slad;
-
- if (!a) {
- a = &stack_data;
- COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
- a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
- }
-
- /*
- * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry. This is because
- * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
- * safe. Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
- * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
- * happened a little later.
- */
- if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE) &&
- (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
- return -ECHILD;
-
- slad.tclass = tclass;
- slad.requested = requested;
- slad.ssid = ssid;
- slad.tsid = tsid;
- slad.audited = audited;
- slad.denied = denied;
-
- a->selinux_audit_data->slad = &slad;
- common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions
- * @avd: access vector decisions
- * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
- * @a: auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
- *
- * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
- * with the policy. This function is typically called by
- * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
- * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
- * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
- * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
- * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
- * before calling the auditing code.
- */
-inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
- unsigned flags)
-{
- u32 denied, audited;
- denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
- if (unlikely(denied)) {
- audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
- /*
- * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
- * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
- * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
- * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the
- * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets
- * assume:
- *
- * denied == READ
- * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
- * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
- *
- * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
- * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
- * ACCESS
- */
- if (a &&
- a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny &&
- !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
- audited = 0;
- } else if (result)
- audited = denied = requested;
- else
- audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
- if (likely(!audited))
- return 0;
-
- return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
- requested, audited, denied,
- a, flags);
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
- * @callback: callback function
- * @events: security events
- * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
- * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @perms: permissions
- *
- * Register a callback function for events in the set @events
- * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid)
- * and the permissions @perms, interpreting
- * @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or
- * -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback.
- */
-int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms,
- u32 *out_retained),
- u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms)
-{
- struct avc_callback_node *c;
- int rc = 0;
-
- c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!c) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- c->callback = callback;
- c->events = events;
- c->ssid = ssid;
- c->tsid = tsid;
- c->perms = perms;
- c->next = avc_callbacks;
- avc_callbacks = c;
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
-static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
-{
- return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD);
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
- * @event : Updating event
- * @perms : Permission mask bits
- * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
- * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
- *
- * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
- * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
- * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
- * will release later by RCU.
- */
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 seqno)
-{
- int hvalue, rc = 0;
- unsigned long flag;
- struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
- struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
- spinlock_t *lock;
-
- node = avc_alloc_node();
- if (!node) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Lock the target slot */
- hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-
- head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
- lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
-
- hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
- if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
- tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
- tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
- seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
- orig = pos;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!orig) {
- rc = -ENOENT;
- avc_node_kill(node);
- goto out_unlock;
- }
-
- /*
- * Copy and replace original node.
- */
-
- avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
-
- switch (event) {
- case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
- node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
- break;
- case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
- case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
- node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms;
- break;
- case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE:
- node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms;
- break;
- case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE:
- node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms;
- break;
- case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE:
- node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms;
- break;
- case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
- node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
- break;
- }
- avc_node_replace(node, orig);
-out_unlock:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_flush - Flush the cache
- */
-static void avc_flush(void)
-{
- struct hlist_head *head;
- struct hlist_node *next;
- struct avc_node *node;
- spinlock_t *lock;
- unsigned long flag;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
- head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
- lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
- /*
- * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
- * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
- */
- rcu_read_lock();
- hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
- avc_node_delete(node);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
- * @seqno: policy sequence number
- */
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
-{
- struct avc_callback_node *c;
- int rc = 0, tmprc;
-
- avc_flush();
-
- for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
- if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
- tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
- /* save the first error encountered for the return
- value and continue processing the callbacks */
- if (!rc)
- rc = tmprc;
- }
- }
-
- avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit,
- * when the avc_node lookup fails. We get called with
- * the RCU read lock held, and need to return with it
- * still held, but drop if for the security compute.
- *
- * Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just
- * results in a bigger stack frame.
- */
-static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
-{
- rcu_read_unlock();
- security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
- rcu_read_lock();
- return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-}
-
-static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- unsigned flags,
- struct av_decision *avd)
-{
- if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
- return -EACCES;
-
- if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
- return -EACCES;
-
- avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
- tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
- * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0
- * @avd: access vector decisions
- *
- * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
- * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
- * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
- * a new decision and add it to the cache. Return a copy of the decisions
- * in @avd. Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted,
- * -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or another -errno upon
- * other errors. This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),
- * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from
- * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
- * should be released for the auditing.
- */
-inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- unsigned flags,
- struct av_decision *avd)
-{
- struct avc_node *node;
- int rc = 0;
- u32 denied;
-
- BUG_ON(!requested);
-
- rcu_read_lock();
-
- node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- if (unlikely(!node)) {
- node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
- } else {
- memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
- avd = &node->ae.avd;
- }
-
- denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
- if (unlikely(denied))
- rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
-
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
- * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
- *
- * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
- * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
- * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
- * a new decision and add it to the cache. Audit the granting or denial of
- * permissions in accordance with the policy. Return %0 if all @requested
- * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
- * another -errno upon other errors.
- */
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
- unsigned flags)
-{
- struct av_decision avd;
- int rc, rc2;
-
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
-
- rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
- flags);
- if (rc2)
- return rc2;
- return rc;
-}
-
-u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
-{
- return avc_cache.latest_notif;
-}
-
-void avc_disable(void)
-{
- /*
- * If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
- * not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
- * I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know. It's
- * possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
- * it still pointed to selinux operations. If that is the case it's
- * possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
- * avc_node_cachep. I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
- * in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it. Instead I just flush
- * the cache and get that memory back.
- */
- if (avc_node_cachep) {
- avc_flush();
- /* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
- }
-}