7 files changed, 0 insertions, 913 deletions

diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
deleted file mode 100644
index afbb59dd..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-config EVM
-	boolean "EVM support"
-	depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
-	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_MD5
-	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
-	default n
-	help
-	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
-	  integrity attacks.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/Makefile b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index 7393c415..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM)
-#
-obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
-
-evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
-evm-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) += evm_posix_acl.o
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c885247e..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Authors:
- * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
- * File: evm.h
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
-#define __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
-
-#include <linux/xattr.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-
-#include "../integrity.h"
-
-extern int evm_initialized;
-extern char *evm_hmac;
-extern char *evm_hash;
-
-extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
-extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-
-/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
-extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
-
-extern int evm_init_key(void);
-extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			       const char *req_xattr_name,
-			       const char *req_xattr_value,
-			       size_t req_xattr_value_len);
-extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-			 const char *req_xattr_value,
-			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-			 const char *req_xattr_value,
-			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
-			 char *hmac_val);
-extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
-extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void);
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 49a464f5..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Authors:
- * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
- * File: evm_crypto.c
- *	 Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <linux/xattr.h>
-#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include "evm.h"
-
-#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
-#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
-static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
-static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
-
-struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
-struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
-
-static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
-{
-	long rc;
-	char *algo;
-	struct crypto_shash **tfm;
-	struct shash_desc *desc;
-
-	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
-		tfm = &hmac_tfm;
-		algo = evm_hmac;
-	} else {
-		tfm = &hash_tfm;
-		algo = evm_hash;
-	}
-
-	if (*tfm == NULL) {
-		mutex_lock(&mutex);
-		if (*tfm)
-			goto out;
-		*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-		if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
-			rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
-			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
-			*tfm = NULL;
-			mutex_unlock(&mutex);
-			return ERR_PTR(rc);
-		}
-		if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
-			rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
-			if (rc) {
-				crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
-				*tfm = NULL;
-				mutex_unlock(&mutex);
-				return ERR_PTR(rc);
-			}
-		}
-out:
-		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
-	}
-
-	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
-			GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!desc)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
-	desc->tfm = *tfm;
-	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-
-	rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
-	if (rc) {
-		kfree(desc);
-		return ERR_PTR(rc);
-	}
-	return desc;
-}
-
-/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
- * specific info.
- *
- * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
- * protection.)
- */
-static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
-			  char *digest)
-{
-	struct h_misc {
-		unsigned long ino;
-		__u32 generation;
-		uid_t uid;
-		gid_t gid;
-		umode_t mode;
-	} hmac_misc;
-
-	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
-	hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
-	hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
-	hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid;
-	hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid;
-	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
-	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
-	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
- *
- * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
- * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
- * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
- */
-static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
-				const char *req_xattr_name,
-				const char *req_xattr_value,
-				size_t req_xattr_value_len,
-				char type, char *digest)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	struct shash_desc *desc;
-	char **xattrname;
-	size_t xattr_size = 0;
-	char *xattr_value = NULL;
-	int error;
-	int size;
-
-	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	desc = init_desc(type);
-	if (IS_ERR(desc))
-		return PTR_ERR(desc);
-
-	error = -ENODATA;
-	for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
-		if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
-		    && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
-			error = 0;
-			crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
-					     req_xattr_value_len);
-			continue;
-		}
-		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
-					  &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
-		if (size == -ENOMEM) {
-			error = -ENOMEM;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if (size < 0)
-			continue;
-
-		error = 0;
-		xattr_size = size;
-		crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
-	}
-	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest);
-
-out:
-	kfree(xattr_value);
-	kfree(desc);
-	return error;
-}
-
-int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
-		  char *digest)
-{
-	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
-				req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
-}
-
-int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
-		  char *digest)
-{
-	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
-				req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
- *
- * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
- */
-int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-			   xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
-	if (rc == 0) {
-		xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
-					   &xattr_data,
-					   sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
-	}
-	else if (rc == -ENODATA)
-		rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
-	return rc;
-}
-
-int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
-		  char *hmac_val)
-{
-	struct shash_desc *desc;
-
-	desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
-	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(desc);
-	}
-
-	crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
-	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val);
-	kfree(desc);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
- */
-int evm_init_key(void)
-{
-	struct key *evm_key;
-	struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
-	if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	down_read(&evm_key->sem);
-	ekp = evm_key->payload.data;
-	if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
-out:
-	/* burn the original key contents */
-	memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
-	up_read(&evm_key->sem);
-	key_put(evm_key);
-	return rc;
-}
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 89015014..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,452 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Author:
- * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
- * File: evm_main.c
- *	implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
- *	evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <linux/xattr.h>
-#include <linux/integrity.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include "evm.h"
-
-int evm_initialized;
-
-char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
-char *evm_hash = "sha1";
-
-char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
-	XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
-	XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
-#endif
-	XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
-	NULL
-};
-
-static int evm_fixmode;
-static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
-{
-	if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
-		evm_fixmode = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
-
-static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	char **xattr;
-	int error;
-	int count = 0;
-
-	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
-	for (xattr = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattr != NULL; xattr++) {
-		error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, *xattr, NULL, 0);
-		if (error < 0) {
-			if (error == -ENODATA)
-				continue;
-			return error;
-		}
-		count++;
-	}
-
-	return count;
-}
-
-/*
- * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
- *
- * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
- * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
- *
- * For performance:
- * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
- *   HMAC.)
- * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
- *
- * Returns integrity status
- */
-static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
-					     const char *xattr_name,
-					     char *xattr_value,
-					     size_t xattr_value_len,
-					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
-{
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
-	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-	int rc, xattr_len;
-
-	if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
-		return iint->evm_status;
-
-	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
-
-	/* first need to know the sig type */
-	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
-				GFP_NOFS);
-	if (rc <= 0) {
-		if (rc == 0)
-			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; /* empty */
-		else if (rc == -ENODATA) {
-			rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
-			if (rc > 0)
-				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
-			else if (rc == 0)
-				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
-		}
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	xattr_len = rc - 1;
-
-	/* check value type */
-	switch (xattr_data->type) {
-	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
-		rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				   xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
-		if (rc)
-			break;
-		rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
-			    sizeof(calc.digest));
-		if (rc)
-			rc = -EINVAL;
-		break;
-	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
-		rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
-		if (rc)
-			break;
-		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
-					xattr_data->digest, xattr_len,
-					calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
-		if (!rc) {
-			/* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
-			evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				   xattr_value_len);
-		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	if (rc)
-		evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
-				INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-out:
-	if (iint)
-		iint->evm_status = evm_status;
-	kfree(xattr_data);
-	return evm_status;
-}
-
-static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
-{
-	char **xattrname;
-	int namelen;
-	int found = 0;
-
-	namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
-	for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
-		if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen)
-		    && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) {
-			found = 1;
-			break;
-		}
-		if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
-			    *xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
-			    strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
-			found = 1;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	return found;
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
- * @dentry: object of the verify xattr
- * @xattr_name: requested xattr
- * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
- * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
- *
- * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
- * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
- * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
- *
- * Returns the xattr integrity status.
- *
- * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
- * is executed.
- */
-enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-				      const char *xattr_name,
-				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
-				      struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
-{
-	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
-		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-
-	if (!iint) {
-		iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode);
-		if (!iint)
-			return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	}
-	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				 xattr_value_len, iint);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
-
-/*
- * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
- *
- * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are
- * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode.
- */
-static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-
-	if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
-		return 0;
-	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
- *
- * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
- * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
- *
- * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
- * affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
- * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
- * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
- * doesn't exist, to be updated.
- */
-static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
-{
-	enum integrity_status evm_status;
-
-	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			return -EPERM;
-	} else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
-		if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
-			return 0;
-		evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
-		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
-		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
-			return 0;
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
-	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
- * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
- * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
- * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
- *
- * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
- */
-int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
-{
-	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				 xattr_value_len);
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
- * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
- *
- * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
- */
-int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
-{
-	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
- * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
- * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
- * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
- *
- * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
- *
- * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
- * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
- * i_mutex lock.
- */
-void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
-{
-	if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
-				 && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
-		return;
-
-	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
-	return;
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
- * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
- *
- * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
- */
-void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-
-	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
-		return;
-
-	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	return;
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
- */
-int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
-{
-	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
-	enum integrity_status evm_status;
-
-	if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
-		return 0;
-	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
-	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
-	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
-		return 0;
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
- * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
- *
- * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
- * changes.
- *
- * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
- * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
- */
-void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
-{
-	if (!evm_initialized)
-		return;
-
-	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
-		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	return;
-}
-
-/*
- * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm
- */
-int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-				 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
-				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
-{
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
-		return 0;
-
-	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!xattr_data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
-	evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data);
-	evm_xattr->name = kstrdup(XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
-	return 0;
-out:
-	kfree(xattr_data);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
-
-static int __init init_evm(void)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	error = evm_init_secfs();
-	if (error < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-err:
-	return error;
-}
-
-static void __exit cleanup_evm(void)
-{
-	evm_cleanup_secfs();
-	if (hmac_tfm)
-		crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
-	if (hash_tfm)
-		crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-}
-
-/*
- * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes
- */
-static int __init evm_display_config(void)
-{
-	char **xattrname;
-
-	for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
-		printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-pure_initcall(evm_display_config);
-late_initcall(init_evm);
-
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b1753e98..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Author:
- * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/xattr.h>
-
-int posix_xattr_acl(char *xattr)
-{
-	int xattr_len = strlen(xattr);
-
-	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == xattr_len)
-	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
-		return 1;
-	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == xattr_len)
-	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ac762995..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Authors:
- * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
- * File: evm_secfs.c
- *	- Used to signal when key is on keyring
- *	- Get the key and enable EVM
- */
-
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include "evm.h"
-
-static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm;
-
-/**
- * evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm
- *
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to put the result
- * @count: maximum to send along
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
-			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	char temp[80];
-	ssize_t rc;
-
-	if (*ppos != 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized);
-	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * evm_write_key - write() for <securityfs>/evm
- * @file: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to get the data from
- * @count: bytes sent
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Used to signal that key is on the kernel key ring.
- * - get the integrity hmac key from the kernel key ring
- * - create list of hmac protected extended attributes
- * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
-			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	char temp[80];
-	int i, error;
-
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized)
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	temp[count] = '\0';
-
-	if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	error = evm_init_key();
-	if (!error) {
-		evm_initialized = 1;
-		pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
-	} else
-		pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
-	return count;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = {
-	.read		= evm_read_key,
-	.write		= evm_write_key,
-};
-
-int __init evm_init_secfs(void)
-{
-	int error = 0;
-
-	evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
-					      NULL, NULL, &evm_key_ops);
-	if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm))
-		error = -EFAULT;
-	return error;
-}
-
-void __exit evm_cleanup_secfs(void)
-{
-	if (evm_init_tpm)
-		securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm);
-}