diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ANDROID_3.4.5/include/linux/capability.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | ANDROID_3.4.5/include/linux/capability.h | 560 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 560 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/include/linux/capability.h b/ANDROID_3.4.5/include/linux/capability.h deleted file mode 100644 index c398cff3..00000000 --- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/include/linux/capability.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,560 +0,0 @@ -/* - * This is <linux/capability.h> - * - * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> - * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no> - * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main. - * - * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance): - * - * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/ - */ - -#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H - -#include <linux/types.h> - -struct task_struct; - -/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user - capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The - kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on - it. */ - -/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to - a set of three capability sets. The transposition of 3*the - following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user - library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free - etc.. */ - -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330 -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1 - -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026 /* deprecated - use v3 */ -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2 - -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 0x20080522 -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 2 - -typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct { - __u32 version; - int pid; -} __user *cap_user_header_t; - -typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { - __u32 effective; - __u32 permitted; - __u32 inheritable; -} __user *cap_user_data_t; - - -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000 -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24 -#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK -#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001 - -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000 -#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1 -#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1)) - -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000 -#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2 -#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2)) - -#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 -#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2 -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 - -struct vfs_cap_data { - __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */ - struct { - __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */ - __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */ - } data[VFS_CAP_U32]; -}; - -#ifndef __KERNEL__ - -/* - * Backwardly compatible definition for source code - trapped in a - * 32-bit world. If you find you need this, please consider using - * libcap to untrap yourself... - */ -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 - -#else - -#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 -#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 - -extern int file_caps_enabled; - -typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { - __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; -} kernel_cap_t; - -/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */ -struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { - __u32 magic_etc; - kernel_cap_t permitted; - kernel_cap_t inheritable; -}; - -#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct)) -#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t)) - -#endif - - -/** - ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities. - **/ - -/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this - overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group - ownership. */ - -#define CAP_CHOWN 0 - -/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if - [_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by - CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */ - -#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1 - -/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files - and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is - defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */ - -#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 2 - -/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where - file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID - is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */ - -#define CAP_FOWNER 3 - -/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID - shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID - bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the - supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting - the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are - cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */ - -#define CAP_FSETID 4 - -/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a - process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID - of the process receiving the signal. */ - -#define CAP_KILL 5 - -/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */ -/* Allows setgroups(2) */ -/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */ - -#define CAP_SETGID 6 - -/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */ -/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */ - -#define CAP_SETUID 7 - - -/** - ** Linux-specific capabilities - **/ - -/* Without VFS support for capabilities: - * Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid, - * remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid - * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but) - * Add any capability from current's capability bounding set - * to the current process' inheritable set - * Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set - * Allow modification of the securebits for a process - */ - -#define CAP_SETPCAP 8 - -/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */ - -#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE 9 - -/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */ -/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */ - -#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10 - -/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */ - -#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST 11 - -/* Allow interface configuration */ -/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */ -/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */ -/* Allow modification of routing tables */ -/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on - sockets */ -/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_RAW) */ -/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */ -/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */ -/* Allow clearing driver statistics */ -/* Allow multicasting */ -/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */ -/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */ - -#define CAP_NET_ADMIN 12 - -/* Allow use of RAW sockets */ -/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */ -/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_ADMIN) */ - -#define CAP_NET_RAW 13 - -/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */ -/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do - with IPC) */ - -#define CAP_IPC_LOCK 14 - -/* Override IPC ownership checks */ - -#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15 - -/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */ -#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16 - -/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */ -/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */ - -#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO 17 - -/* Allow use of chroot() */ - -#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT 18 - -/* Allow ptrace() of any process */ - -#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE 19 - -/* Allow configuration of process accounting */ - -#define CAP_SYS_PACCT 20 - -/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */ -/* Allow administration of the random device */ -/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */ -/* Allow setting the domainname */ -/* Allow setting the hostname */ -/* Allow calling bdflush() */ -/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */ -/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */ -/* Allow nfsservctl */ -/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */ -/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */ -/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */ -/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */ -/* Allow removing semaphores */ -/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores - and shared memory */ -/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */ -/* Allow turning swap on/off */ -/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */ -/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */ -/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */ -/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */ -/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some - extra ioctls) */ -/* Allow tuning the ide driver */ -/* Allow access to the nvram device */ -/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */ -/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */ -/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */ -/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */ -/* Allow setting up serial ports */ -/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */ -/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending - arbitrary SCSI commands */ -/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */ -/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */ - -#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21 - -/* Allow use of reboot() */ - -#define CAP_SYS_BOOT 22 - -/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different - UID) processes */ -/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own - processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another - process. */ -/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */ - -#define CAP_SYS_NICE 23 - -/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */ -/* Override quota limits. */ -/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */ -/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling - resources) */ -/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so - you can override using fsuid too */ -/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */ -/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */ -/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */ -/* Override max number of keymaps */ - -#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE 24 - -/* Allow manipulation of system clock */ -/* Allow irix_stime on mips */ -/* Allow setting the real-time clock */ - -#define CAP_SYS_TIME 25 - -/* Allow configuration of tty devices */ -/* Allow vhangup() of tty */ - -#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG 26 - -/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */ - -#define CAP_MKNOD 27 - -/* Allow taking of leases on files */ - -#define CAP_LEASE 28 - -#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE 29 - -#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30 - -#define CAP_SETFCAP 31 - -/* Override MAC access. - The base kernel enforces no MAC policy. - An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses - to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is - the capability it should use to do so. */ - -#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE 32 - -/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes. - The base kernel requires no MAC configuration. - An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses - to implement capability based checks on modifications to that - policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the - capability it should use to do so. */ - -#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33 - -/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */ - -#define CAP_SYSLOG 34 - -/* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */ - -#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM 35 - -/* Allow preventing system suspends while epoll events are pending */ - -#define CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP 36 - -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP - -#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) - -/* - * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel) - */ - -#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */ -#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */ - -#ifdef __KERNEL__ - -struct dentry; -struct user_namespace; - -struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void); - -extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set; -extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; - -/* - * Internal kernel functions only - */ - -#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \ - for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) - -/* - * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS: - * - * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant. - * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. - * - * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs. - * - * We could also define fsmask as follows: - * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions - * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions - */ - -# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID)) - -# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - -#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 -# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers -#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ - -# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) -# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ - CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) -# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \ - CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) - -#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ - -# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0) - -#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) -#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) -#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) - -#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \ -do { \ - unsigned __capi; \ - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ - c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \ - } \ -} while (0) - -#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \ -do { \ - unsigned __capi; \ - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ - c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \ - } \ -} while (0) - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t b) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t b) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t drop) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~); - return dest; -} - -static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - unsigned __capi; - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { - if (a.cap[__capi] != 0) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/* - * Check if "a" is a subset of "set". - * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set" - * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1 - * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set" - * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0 - */ -static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - dest = cap_drop(a, set); - return cap_isclear(dest); -} - -/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */ - -static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t permitted) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return cap_combine(a, - cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set)); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; - return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t permitted) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; - return cap_combine(a, - cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set)); -} - -extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap); -extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); -extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool capable(int cap); -extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool nsown_capable(int cap); - -/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ -extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); - -#endif /* __KERNEL__ */ - -#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */ |