1 files changed, 0 insertions, 211 deletions
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 0808fbf0..00000000
--- a/ANDROID_3.4.5/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright IBM Corp. 2006,2007
- * Author(s): Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
- * Driver for the s390 pseudo random number generator
- */
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <asm/debug.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
-
-#include "crypt_s390.h"
-
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 PRNG interface");
-
-static int prng_chunk_size = 256;
-module_param(prng_chunk_size, int, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_chunk_size, "PRNG read chunk size in bytes");
-
-static int prng_entropy_limit = 4096;
-module_param(prng_entropy_limit, int, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH | S_IWUSR);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_entropy_limit,
-	"PRNG add entropy after that much bytes were produced");
-
-/*
- * Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is,
- * of course, in a state of sin. -- John von Neumann
- */
-
-struct s390_prng_data {
-	unsigned long count; /* how many bytes were produced */
-	char *buf;
-};
-
-static struct s390_prng_data *p;
-
-/* copied from libica, use a non-zero initial parameter block */
-static unsigned char parm_block[32] = {
-0x0F,0x2B,0x8E,0x63,0x8C,0x8E,0xD2,0x52,0x64,0xB7,0xA0,0x7B,0x75,0x28,0xB8,0xF4,
-0x75,0x5F,0xD2,0xA6,0x8D,0x97,0x11,0xFF,0x49,0xD8,0x23,0xF3,0x7E,0x21,0xEC,0xA0,
-};
-
-static int prng_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
-}
-
-static void prng_add_entropy(void)
-{
-	__u64 entropy[4];
-	unsigned int i;
-	int ret;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
-		ret = crypt_s390_kmc(KMC_PRNG, parm_block, (char *)entropy,
-				     (char *)entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-		BUG_ON(ret < 0 || ret != sizeof(entropy));
-		memcpy(parm_block, entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-	}
-}
-
-static void prng_seed(int nbytes)
-{
-	char buf[16];
-	int i = 0;
-
-	BUG_ON(nbytes > 16);
-	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
-
-	/* Add the entropy */
-	while (nbytes >= 8) {
-		*((__u64 *)parm_block) ^= *((__u64 *)(buf+i));
-		prng_add_entropy();
-		i += 8;
-		nbytes -= 8;
-	}
-	prng_add_entropy();
-}
-
-static ssize_t prng_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, size_t nbytes,
-			 loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	int chunk, n;
-	int ret = 0;
-	int tmp;
-
-	/* nbytes can be arbitrary length, we split it into chunks */
-	while (nbytes) {
-		/* same as in extract_entropy_user in random.c */
-		if (need_resched()) {
-			if (signal_pending(current)) {
-				if (ret == 0)
-					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
-				break;
-			}
-			schedule();
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * we lose some random bytes if an attacker issues
-		 * reads < 8 bytes, but we don't care
-		 */
-		chunk = min_t(int, nbytes, prng_chunk_size);
-
-		/* PRNG only likes multiples of 8 bytes */
-		n = (chunk + 7) & -8;
-
-		if (p->count > prng_entropy_limit)
-			prng_seed(8);
-
-		/* if the CPU supports PRNG stckf is present too */
-		asm volatile(".insn     s,0xb27c0000,%0"
-			     : "=m" (*((unsigned long long *)p->buf)) : : "cc");
-
-		/*
-		 * Beside the STCKF the input for the TDES-EDE is the output
-		 * of the last operation. We differ here from X9.17 since we
-		 * only store one timestamp into the buffer. Padding the whole
-		 * buffer with timestamps does not improve security, since
-		 * successive stckf have nearly constant offsets.
-		 * If an attacker knows the first timestamp it would be
-		 * trivial to guess the additional values. One timestamp
-		 * is therefore enough and still guarantees unique input values.
-		 *
-		 * Note: you can still get strict X9.17 conformity by setting
-		 * prng_chunk_size to 8 bytes.
-		*/
-		tmp = crypt_s390_kmc(KMC_PRNG, parm_block, p->buf, p->buf, n);
-		BUG_ON((tmp < 0) || (tmp != n));
-
-		p->count += n;
-
-		if (copy_to_user(ubuf, p->buf, chunk))
-			return -EFAULT;
-
-		nbytes -= chunk;
-		ret += chunk;
-		ubuf += chunk;
-	}
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations prng_fops = {
-	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
-	.open		= &prng_open,
-	.release	= NULL,
-	.read		= &prng_read,
-	.llseek		= noop_llseek,
-};
-
-static struct miscdevice prng_dev = {
-	.name	= "prandom",
-	.minor	= MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
-	.fops	= &prng_fops,
-};
-
-static int __init prng_init(void)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	/* check if the CPU has a PRNG */
-	if (!crypt_s390_func_available(KMC_PRNG, CRYPT_S390_MSA))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
-	if (prng_chunk_size < 8)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct s390_prng_data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!p)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	p->count = 0;
-
-	p->buf = kmalloc(prng_chunk_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!p->buf) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out_free;
-	}
-
-	/* initialize the PRNG, add 128 bits of entropy */
-	prng_seed(16);
-
-	ret = misc_register(&prng_dev);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out_buf;
-	return 0;
-
-out_buf:
-	kfree(p->buf);
-out_free:
-	kfree(p);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static void __exit prng_exit(void)
-{
-	/* wipe me */
-	kzfree(p->buf);
-	kfree(p);
-
-	misc_deregister(&prng_dev);
-}
-
-module_init(prng_init);
-module_exit(prng_exit);