init android origin source code

6 files changed, 6313 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/Kconfig b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..603b0878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+config SECURITY_SMACK
+	bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support"
+	depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
+	  Smack is useful for sensitivity, integrity, and a variety
+	  of other mandatory security schemes.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/Makefile b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..67a63aae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#
+# Makefile for the SMACK LSM
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o
+
+smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack.h b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4ede7199
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+#define _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+
+/*
+ * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
+ * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
+ * of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
+ * aside for the terminating null byte.
+ */
+#define SMK_MAXLEN	23
+#define SMK_LABELLEN	(SMK_MAXLEN+1)
+
+struct superblock_smack {
+	char		*smk_root;
+	char		*smk_floor;
+	char		*smk_hat;
+	char		*smk_default;
+	int		smk_initialized;
+	spinlock_t	smk_sblock;	/* for initialization */
+};
+
+struct socket_smack {
+	char		*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
+	char		*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
+	char		*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Inode smack data
+ */
+struct inode_smack {
+	char		*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
+	char		*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
+	char		*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
+	struct mutex	smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
+	int		smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
+};
+
+struct task_smack {
+	char			*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
+	char			*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
+	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
+};
+
+#define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
+#define	SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE	0x02	/* directory is transmuting */
+
+/*
+ * A label access rule.
+ */
+struct smack_rule {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	char			*smk_subject;
+	char			*smk_object;
+	int			smk_access;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table mapping smack values to
+ * CIPSO level/category-set values.
+ */
+struct smack_cipso {
+	int	smk_level;
+	char	smk_catset[SMK_LABELLEN];
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct sockaddr_in	smk_host;	/* network address */
+	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
+	char			*smk_label;	/* label */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * and so that they can be shared.
+ *
+ * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
+ * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
+ * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
+ * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
+ * never deleted.
+ *
+ * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
+ * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
+ * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
+ * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
+ * these components have been repaired.
+ *
+ * If there is a cipso value associated with the label it
+ * gets stored here, too. This will most likely be rare as
+ * the cipso direct mapping in used internally.
+ *
+ * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
+ * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
+ * time.
+ */
+struct smack_known {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	char			smk_known[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	u32			smk_secid;
+	struct smack_cipso	*smk_cipso;
+	spinlock_t		smk_cipsolock;	/* for changing cipso map */
+	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* access rules */
+	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mount options
+ */
+#define SMK_FSDEFAULT	"smackfsdef="
+#define SMK_FSFLOOR	"smackfsfloor="
+#define SMK_FSHAT	"smackfshat="
+#define SMK_FSROOT	"smackfsroot="
+
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION 	"-CIPSO"
+
+/*
+ * How communications on this socket are treated.
+ * Usually it's determined by the underlying netlabel code
+ * but there are certain cases, including single label hosts
+ * and potentially single label interfaces for which the
+ * treatment can not be known in advance.
+ *
+ * The possibility of additional labeling schemes being
+ * introduced in the future exists as well.
+ */
+#define SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET	0
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET	1
+
+/*
+ * smackfs magic number
+ */
+#define SMACK_MAGIC	0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
+
+/*
+ * CIPSO defaults.
+ */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT		3	/* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_INVALID		-1	/* Not a DOI */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT	250	/* Arbitrary */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATVAL		63	/* Bigger gets harder */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL            255     /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM           239     /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
+
+/*
+ * Flag for transmute access
+ */
+#define MAY_TRANSMUTE	64
+/*
+ * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
+ */
+#define MAY_ANYREAD	(MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
+#define MAY_READWRITE	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+#define MAY_NOT		0
+
+/*
+ * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxat)
+ */
+#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 5
+
+/* SMACK data */
+struct smack_audit_data {
+	const char *function;
+	char *subject;
+	char *object;
+	char *request;
+	int result;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
+ * to save some stack
+ */
+struct smk_audit_info {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct common_audit_data a;
+	struct smack_audit_data sad;
+#endif
+};
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_lsm.c
+ */
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
+
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_access.c
+ */
+int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
+int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
+char *smack_from_cipso(u32, char *);
+char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+void smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len, char *smack);
+char *smk_import(const char *, int);
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
+struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
+
+/*
+ * Shared data.
+ */
+extern int smack_cipso_direct;
+extern char *smack_net_ambient;
+extern char *smack_onlycap;
+extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
+
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
+
+extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
+extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
+
+extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
+
+/*
+ * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
+ * Set the category bit number in a smack label sized buffer.
+ */
+static inline void smack_catset_bit(int cat, char *catsetp)
+{
+	if (cat > SMK_LABELLEN * 8)
+		return;
+
+	catsetp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Is the directory transmuting?
+ */
+static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+	return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+	return sip->smk_inode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+	return tsp->smk_task;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+	return tsp->smk_forked;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
+{
+	return smk_of_task(current_security());
+}
+
+/*
+ * logging functions
+ */
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT 0x2
+extern int log_policy;
+
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+		int request,
+		int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/*
+ * some inline functions to set up audit data
+ * they do nothing if CONFIG_AUDIT is not set
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+			       char type)
+{
+	memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+	a->a.type = type;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init_net(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+				   char type, struct lsm_network_audit *net)
+{
+	smk_ad_init(a, func, type);
+	memset(net, 0, sizeof(*net));
+	a->a.u.net = net;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					 struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	a->a.u.tsk = t;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						    struct dentry *d)
+{
+	a->a.u.dentry = d;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					      struct inode *i)
+{
+	a->a.u.inode = i;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					     struct path p)
+{
+	a->a.u.path = p;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					    struct sock *sk)
+{
+	a->a.u.net->sk = sk;
+}
+
+#else /* no AUDIT */
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+			       char type)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					 struct task_struct *t)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						    struct dentry *d)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+						 struct vfsmount *m)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					      struct inode *i)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					     struct path p)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+					    struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif  /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack_access.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack_access.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c8115f73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
+	.smk_known	= "?",
+	.smk_secid	= 2,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_hat = {
+	.smk_known	= "^",
+	.smk_secid	= 3,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_star = {
+	.smk_known	= "*",
+	.smk_secid	= 4,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
+	.smk_known	= "_",
+	.smk_secid	= 5,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
+	.smk_known	= "",
+	.smk_secid	= 6,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
+	.smk_known	= "@",
+	.smk_secid	= 7,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list);
+
+/*
+ * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
+ * known values above.
+ */
+static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
+
+/*
+ * what events do we log
+ * can be overwritten at run-time by /smack/logging
+ */
+int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
+
+/**
+ * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
+ * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to search
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns the access mode. If no
+ * entry is found returns -ENOENT.
+ *
+ * NOTE:
+ *
+ * Earlier versions of this function allowed for labels that
+ * were not on the label list. This was done to allow for
+ * labels to come over the network that had never been seen
+ * before on this host. Unless the receiving socket has the
+ * star label this will always result in a failure check. The
+ * star labeled socket case is now handled in the networking
+ * hooks so there is no case where the label is not on the
+ * label list. Checking to see if the address of two labels
+ * is the same is now a reliable test.
+ *
+ * Do the object check first because that is more
+ * likely to differ.
+ */
+int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+			struct list_head *rule_list)
+{
+	int may = -ENOENT;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
+		if (srp->smk_object == object_label &&
+		    srp->smk_subject == subject_label) {
+			may = srp->smk_access;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
+ * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : a pointer to the audit data
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * Smack labels are shared on smack_list
+ */
+int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+	       struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int may = MAY_NOT;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardcoded comparisons.
+	 *
+	 * A star subject can't access any object.
+	 */
+	if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
+		goto out_audit;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
+	 * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
+	 * An internet subject can access any object.
+	 */
+	if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+	    subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+		goto out_audit;
+	/*
+	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
+	 */
+	if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known)
+		goto out_audit;
+	/*
+	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
+	 * with the same label.
+	 */
+	if (subject_label == object_label)
+		goto out_audit;
+	/*
+	 * A hat subject can read any object.
+	 * A floor object can be read by any subject.
+	 */
+	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
+		if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known)
+			goto out_audit;
+		if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known)
+			goto out_audit;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
+	 * If the requested access is contained in the available
+	 * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
+	 * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
+	 * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
+	 */
+	skp = smk_find_entry(subject_label);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &skp->smk_rules);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
+		goto out_audit;
+
+	rc = -EACCES;
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (a)
+		smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a);
+#endif
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	int may;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the global rule list
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
+		 * it can further restrict access.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may < 0)
+			goto out_audit;
+		if ((mode & may) == mode)
+			goto out_audit;
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
+	 * only one that gets privilege and current does not
+	 * have that label.
+	 */
+	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
+		goto out_audit;
+
+	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		rc = 0;
+
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	if (a)
+		smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
+#endif
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/**
+ * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
+ * readable string
+ * @string : the string to fill
+ * @access : the int
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	if (access & MAY_READ)
+		string[i++] = 'r';
+	if (access & MAY_WRITE)
+		string[i++] = 'w';
+	if (access & MAY_EXEC)
+		string[i++] = 'x';
+	if (access & MAY_APPEND)
+		string[i++] = 'a';
+	string[i] = '\0';
+}
+/**
+ * smack_log_callback - SMACK specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab : the audit_buffer
+ * @a  : audit_data
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad = ad->smack_audit_data;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
+			 ad->smack_audit_data->function,
+			 sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
+	audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+}
+
+/**
+ *  smack_log - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ *  @subject_label : smack label of the requester
+ *  @object_label  : smack label of the object being accessed
+ *  @request: requested permissions
+ *  @result: result from smk_access
+ *  @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.
+ */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+	       int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+	char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad;
+	struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
+
+	/* check if we have to log the current event */
+	if (result != 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	sad = a->smack_audit_data;
+
+	if (sad->function == NULL)
+		sad->function = "unknown";
+
+	/* end preparing the audit data */
+	smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
+	sad->subject = subject_label;
+	sad->object  = object_label;
+	sad->request = request_buffer;
+	sad->result  = result;
+
+	common_lsm_audit(a, smack_log_callback, NULL);
+}
+#else /* #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+               int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
+
+/**
+ * smk_find_entry - find a label on the list, return the list entry
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, string, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0)
+			return skp;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_smack - parse smack label from a text string
+ * @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ * @smack: parsed smack label, or NULL if parse error
+ */
+void smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len, char *smack)
+{
+	int found;
+	int i;
+
+	if (len <= 0 || len > SMK_MAXLEN)
+		len = SMK_MAXLEN;
+
+	for (i = 0, found = 0; i < SMK_LABELLEN; i++) {
+		if (found)
+			smack[i] = '\0';
+		else if (i >= len || string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' ||
+			 string[i] == '/' || string[i] == '"' ||
+			 string[i] == '\\' || string[i] == '\'') {
+			smack[i] = '\0';
+			found = 1;
+		} else
+			smack[i] = string[i];
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_import_entry - import a label, return the list entry
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+
+	smk_parse_smack(string, len, smack);
+	if (smack[0] == '\0')
+		return NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
+
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (skp != NULL) {
+			strncpy(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+			skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
+			skp->smk_cipso = NULL;
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&skp->smk_rules);
+			spin_lock_init(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
+			mutex_init(&skp->smk_rules_lock);
+			/*
+			 * Make sure that the entry is actually
+			 * filled before putting it on the list.
+			 */
+			list_add_rcu(&skp->list, &smack_known_list);
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_import - import a smack label
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the label in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
+ */
+char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	/* labels cannot begin with a '-' */
+	if (string[0] == '-')
+		return NULL;
+	skp = smk_import_entry(string, len);
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return skp->smk_known;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
+ * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one,
+ * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
+ */
+char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return skp->smk_known;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we got this far someone asked for the translation
+	 * of a secid that is not on the list.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_secid - find the secid associated with a Smack label
+ * @smack: the Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns the appropriate secid if there is one,
+ * otherwise 0
+ */
+u32 smack_to_secid(const char *smack)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return skp->smk_secid;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_cipso - find the Smack label associated with a CIPSO option
+ * @level: Bell & LaPadula level from the network
+ * @cp: Bell & LaPadula categories from the network
+ *
+ * This is a simple lookup in the label table.
+ *
+ * Return the matching label from the label list or NULL.
+ */
+char *smack_from_cipso(u32 level, char *cp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *kp;
+	char *final = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry(kp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+			continue;
+
+		spin_lock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
+
+		if (kp->smk_cipso->smk_level == level &&
+		    memcmp(kp->smk_cipso->smk_catset, cp, SMK_LABELLEN) == 0)
+			final = kp->smk_known;
+
+		spin_unlock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
+
+		if (final != NULL)
+			break;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return final;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_cipso - find the CIPSO option to go with a Smack label
+ * @smack: a pointer to the smack label in question
+ * @cp: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Returns zero if a value is available, non-zero otherwise.
+ */
+int smack_to_cipso(const char *smack, struct smack_cipso *cp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *kp;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(kp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+		if (kp->smk_known == smack ||
+		    strcmp(kp->smk_known, smack) == 0) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (found == 0 || kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	memcpy(cp, kp->smk_cipso, sizeof(struct smack_cipso));
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..45c32f07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3725 @@
+/*
+ *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:
+ *	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
+ *  Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#define task_security(task)	(task_cred_xxx((task), security))
+
+#define TRANS_TRUE	"TRUE"
+#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE	4
+
+/**
+ * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
+ * @ip: a pointer to the inode
+ * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
+ * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
+ */
+static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
+
+	if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return smk_import(in, rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
+ * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (isp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	isp->smk_inode = smack;
+	isp->smk_flags = 0;
+	mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
+
+	return isp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
+ * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	tsp->smk_task = task;
+	tsp->smk_forked = forked;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
+	mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+
+	return tsp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
+ * @nhead - new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead - old rules header pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *nrp;
+	struct smack_rule *orp;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
+		nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
+		if (nrp == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+		*nrp = *orp;
+		list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hooks.
+ * We he, that is fun!
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * @ctp: child task pointer
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	char *tsp;
+
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	char *tsp;
+
+	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
+ * @type: message type
+ *
+ * Require that the task has the floor label
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	char *sp = smk_of_current();
+
+	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
+		rc = -EACCES;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Superblock Hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+
+	sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (sbsp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
+	spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
+
+	sb->s_security = sbsp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	kfree(sb->s_security);
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
+ * @orig: where to start
+ * @smackopts: mount options string
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ *
+ * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
+ * options list.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
+{
+	char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
+
+	otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (otheropts == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
+		if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else
+			dp = otheropts;
+
+		commap = strchr(cp, ',');
+		if (commap != NULL)
+			*commap = '\0';
+
+		if (*dp != '\0')
+			strcat(dp, ",");
+		strcat(dp, cp);
+	}
+
+	strcpy(orig, otheropts);
+	free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @flags: the mount flags
+ * @data: the smack mount options
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
+	struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	char *op;
+	char *commap;
+	char *nsp;
+
+	spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
+		spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
+	spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+
+	for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
+		commap = strchr(op, ',');
+		if (commap != NULL)
+			*commap++ = '\0';
+
+		if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_hat = nsp;
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_floor = nsp;
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
+				   strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_default = nsp;
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_root = nsp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the root inode.
+	 */
+	isp = inode->i_security;
+	if (isp == NULL)
+		inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
+ * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
+ * and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
+ * @dev_name: unused
+ * @path: mount point
+ * @type: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ * @data: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
+ * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+			  char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
+
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
+ * @mnt: file system to unmount
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
+ * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct path path;
+
+	path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
+
+	sbp = path.dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BPRM hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
+ * @bprm: the exec information
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+		return 0;
+
+	isp = inode->i_security;
+	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (bprm->unsafe)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
+	bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
+ * from bprm.
+ *
+ * @bprm: binprm for exec
+ */
+static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
+
+	if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
+		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
+ * @bprm: binprm for exec
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
+
+	if (!ret && (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked))
+		ret = 1;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inode hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
+	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode with a blob
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer in inode
+ */
+static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	kfree(inode->i_security);
+	inode->i_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
+ * @inode: the inode
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @qstr: unused
+ * @name: where to put the attribute name
+ * @value: where to put the attribute value
+ * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				     const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				     void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char *csp = smk_of_current();
+	char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+	char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
+	int may;
+
+	if (name) {
+		*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*name == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (value) {
+		skp = smk_find_entry(csp);
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		may = smk_access_entry(csp, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		/*
+		 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
+		 * the directory requests transmutation then
+		 * by all means transmute.
+		 */
+		if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+		    smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
+			isp = dsp;
+
+		*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*value == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (len)
+		*len = strlen(isp) + 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
+ * @old_dentry: the existing object
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	char *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: file to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the object, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: directory to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the directory, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
+ * @old_inode: the old directory
+ * @old_dentry: unused
+ * @new_inode: the new directory
+ * @new_dentry: unused
+ *
+ * Read and write access is required on both the old and
+ * new directories.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
+			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			      struct inode *new_inode,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
+ * @inode: the inode in question
+ * @mask: the access requested
+ *
+ * This is the important Smack hook.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+
+	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+	/*
+	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
+	 */
+	if (mask == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* May be droppable after audit */
+	if (no_block)
+		return -ECHILD;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @iattr: for the force flag
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	/*
+	 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
+	 */
+	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
+		return 0;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
+ * @mnt: unused
+ * @dentry: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct path path;
+
+	path.dentry = dentry;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: unused
+ * @size: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+			rc = -EPERM;
+		/*
+		 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
+		 * post_setxattr
+		 */
+		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
+		    smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+			rc = -EPERM;
+		if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
+		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
+ * @dentry: object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: attribute size
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
+ * in the master label list.
+ */
+static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	char *nsp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+		if (nsp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_inode = nsp;
+		else
+			isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+		if (nsp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_task = nsp;
+		else
+			isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+		if (nsp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_mmap = nsp;
+		else
+			isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+			rc = -EPERM;
+	} else
+		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+		isp->smk_task = NULL;
+		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @buffer: where to put the result
+ * @alloc: unused
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
+				   const char *name, void **buffer,
+				   bool alloc)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
+	char *isp;
+	int ilen;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+		ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
+		*buffer = isp;
+		return ilen;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	sbp = ip->i_sb;
+	if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
+	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		isp = ssp->smk_in;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
+		isp = ssp->smk_out;
+	else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		*buffer = isp;
+		rc = ilen;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @buffer: where they go
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+				    size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
+
+	if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
+		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
+		return len;
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
+ * @inode: inode to extract the info from
+ * @secid: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+
+	*secid = smack_to_secid(isp->smk_inode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * File Hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
+ * @file: unused
+ * @mask: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ *
+ * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
+ * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
+ * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
+ *
+ * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
+ * label changing that SELinux does.
+ */
+static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no allocation is done.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no memory is freed.
+ */
+static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what to do
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what action to check
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Generally these operations are harmless.
+ * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
+ * for passing information, so they require write access.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_GETLK:
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_mmap :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ * if mapping anonymous memory.
+ * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+			   unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
+			   unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	char *sp;
+	char *msmack;
+	char *osmack;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+	int may;
+	int mmay;
+	int tmay;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	if (rc || addr_only)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	dp = file->f_dentry;
+
+	if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
+	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
+
+	tsp = current_security();
+	sp = smk_of_current();
+	skp = smk_find_entry(sp);
+	rc = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
+	 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
+	 * to that rule's object label.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
+		osmack = srp->smk_object;
+		/*
+		 * Matching labels always allows access.
+		 */
+		if (msmack == osmack)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * If there is a matching local rule take
+		 * that into account as well.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may == -ENOENT)
+			may = srp->smk_access;
+		else
+			may &= srp->smk_access;
+		/*
+		 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
+		 * possibly have less access.
+		 */
+		if (may == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fetch the global list entry.
+		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * can't have as much access as current.
+		 */
+		skp = smk_find_entry(msmack);
+		mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &skp->smk_rules);
+		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
+		 * potential access, too.
+		 */
+		tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
+			mmay &= tmay;
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is any access available to current that is
+		 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * deny access.
+		 */
+		if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
+ * @file: object in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ * Further research may be required on this one.
+ */
+static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
+ * @tsk: The target task
+ * @fown: the object the signal come from
+ * @signum: unused
+ *
+ * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
+ * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int rc;
+	char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	/*
+	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
+	 */
+	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
+	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
+	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
+	smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	/*
+	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		may = MAY_READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_dentry_open - Smack dentry open processing
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cred: unused
+ *
+ * Set the security blob in the file structure.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+
+	file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Task hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = tsp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
+ * @cred: the credentials in question
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+	struct smack_rule *rp;
+	struct list_head *l;
+	struct list_head *n;
+
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return;
+	cred->security = NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
+		rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
+		list_del(&rp->list);
+		kfree(rp);
+	}
+	kfree(tsp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+	int rc;
+
+	new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
+	if (new_tsp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	new->security = new_tsp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+
+	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+
+
+	/* cbs copy rule list */
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
+ *
+ * Set the security data for a kernel service.
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+	char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+	if (smack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
+ * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
+ *
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
+ * as the objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
+					struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+	struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
+
+	tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
+	tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @access: the access requested
+ * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
+ *
+ * Return 0 if access is permitted
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
+				const char *caller)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @pgid: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @nice: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @ioprio: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @policy: unused
+ * @lp: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @info: unused
+ * @sig: unused
+ * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ *
+ * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
+ * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
+ */
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+			   int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	/*
+	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
+	 * can write the receiver.
+	 */
+	if (secid == 0)
+		return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
+				  &ad);
+	/*
+	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
+	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
+	 * we can't take privilege into account.
+	 */
+	return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
+			  smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
+ * @p: task to wait for
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	char *sp = smk_of_current();
+	char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
+	int rc;
+
+	/* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
+	rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		goto out_log;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
+	 * has privilege to perform operations that might
+	 * account for the smack labels having gotten to
+	 * be different in the first place.
+	 *
+	 * This breaks the strict subject/object access
+	 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
+	 * state into account in the decision as well as
+	 * the smack value.
+	 */
+	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		rc = 0;
+	/* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
+ out_log:
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
+ * @p: task to copy from
+ * @inode: inode to copy to
+ *
+ * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
+ */
+static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+	isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Socket hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @family: unused
+ * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Assign Smack pointers to current
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	char *csp = smk_of_current();
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ssp->smk_in = csp;
+	ssp->smk_out = csp;
+	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+
+	sk->sk_security = ssp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	kfree(sk->sk_security);
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+
+	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
+		/*
+		* we break after finding the first match because
+		* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+		* so we have found the most specific match
+		*/
+		if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
+		    (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
+			/* we have found the special CIPSO option */
+			if (snp->smk_label == smack_cipso_option)
+				return NULL;
+			return snp->smk_label;
+		}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
+ * @catset: the Smack categories
+ * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
+ *
+ * Allocates and fills attr.mls.cat
+ */
+static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
+{
+	unsigned char *cp;
+	unsigned char m;
+	int cat;
+	int rc;
+	int byte;
+
+	if (!catset)
+		return;
+
+	sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+	sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
+
+	for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < SMK_LABELLEN; cp++, byte++)
+		for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
+			if ((m & *cp) == 0)
+				continue;
+			rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->attr.mls.cat,
+							  cat, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_secattr - fill a secattr from a smack value
+ * @smack: the smack value
+ * @nlsp: where the result goes
+ *
+ * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
+ * It can be used to effect.
+ * It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
+ * Apologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
+ */
+static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
+{
+	struct smack_cipso cipso;
+	int rc;
+
+	nlsp->domain = smack;
+	nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+
+	rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
+		smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
+	} else {
+		nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
+		smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @labeled: socket label scheme
+ *
+ * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
+ * secattr and attach it to the socket.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
+	 * packet labeling based on the label.
+	 * The case of a single label host is different, because
+	 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
+	 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
+	 * label.
+	 */
+	local_bh_disable();
+	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+	if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
+	    labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+	else {
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
+		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	}
+
+	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+	local_bh_enable();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sap: the destination address
+ *
+ * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
+ * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
+ *
+ */
+static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int sk_lbl;
+	char *hostsp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
+	if (hostsp != NULL) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
+		ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
+		ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
+#endif
+		sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	} else {
+		sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
+		rc = 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: size of the attribute
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	char *sp;
+	struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN || size == 0)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	sp = smk_import(value, size);
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		ssp->smk_in = sp;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
+		ssp->smk_out = sp;
+		if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
+			rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+			if (rc != 0)
+				printk(KERN_WARNING
+					"Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
+					__func__, -rc);
+		}
+	} else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: unused
+ * @protocol: unused
+ * @kern: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				    int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	if (family != PF_INET || sock->sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
+	 */
+	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @sap: the other end
+ * @addrlen: size of sap
+ *
+ * Verifies that a connection may be possible
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
+	if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
+ * @flags: the S_ value
+ *
+ * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
+ */
+static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+
+	if (flags & S_IRUGO)
+		may |= MAY_READ;
+	if (flags & S_IWUGO)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (flags & S_IXUGO)
+		may |= MAY_EXEC;
+
+	return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg->security = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	return (char *)shp->shm_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+	isp->security = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+	isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
+ * @shp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmaddr: unused
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+			   int shmflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	return (char *)sma->sem_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+	isp->security = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+	isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
+ * @sma : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @semflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
+	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+	case IPC_SET:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @sops: unused
+ * @nsops: unused
+ * @alter: unused
+ *
+ * Treated as read and write in all cases.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+			   unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+	kisp->security = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+	kisp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	return (char *)msq->q_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
+ * @msq : the msq
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
+{
+	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				  int msqflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @target: unused
+ * @type: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+			struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @flag: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
+{
+	char *isp = ipp->security;
+	int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
+#endif
+	return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @secid: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+{
+	char *smack = ipp->security;
+
+	*secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
+ * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
+ * @inode: the object
+ *
+ * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
+ */
+static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	char *csp = smk_of_current();
+	char *fetched;
+	char *final;
+	char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
+	int transflag = 0;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+
+	if (inode == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	isp = inode->i_security;
+
+	mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * If the inode is already instantiated
+	 * take the quick way out
+	 */
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
+		goto unlockandout;
+
+	sbp = inode->i_sb;
+	sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+	/*
+	 * We're going to use the superblock default label
+	 * if there's no label on the file.
+	 */
+	final = sbsp->smk_default;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is the root inode the superblock
+	 * may be in the process of initialization.
+	 * If that is the case use the root value out
+	 * of the superblock.
+	 */
+	if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
+		isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+		goto unlockandout;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This is pretty hackish.
+	 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
+	 * file system specific code, but it does help
+	 * with keeping it simple.
+	 */
+	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+	case SMACK_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
+		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
+		 * extended attributes.
+		 */
+		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		break;
+	case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
+		 */
+		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		break;
+	case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
+		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
+		 * pty with respect.
+		 */
+		final = csp;
+		break;
+	case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+		 * structures associated with the task involved.
+		 */
+		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		break;
+	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
+		 * The superblock default suffices.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
+		 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
+		 * getting recreated on every reboot.
+		 */
+		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		/*
+		 * No break.
+		 *
+		 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
+		 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
+		 * to set mount options simulate setting the
+		 * superblock default.
+		 */
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * This isn't an understood special case.
+		 * Get the value from the xattr.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
+		 */
+		if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
+			final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
+		 * Use the aforeapplied default.
+		 * It would be curious if the label of the task
+		 * does not match that assigned.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
+		 */
+		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
+		fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
+		if (fetched != NULL) {
+			final = fetched;
+			if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+				trattr[0] = '\0';
+				inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
+					XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+					trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
+				if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
+					    TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0)
+					transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+			}
+		}
+		isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
+
+		dput(dp);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (final == NULL)
+		isp->smk_inode = csp;
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = final;
+
+	isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
+
+unlockandout:
+	mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	int slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	slen = strlen(cp);
+	*value = cp;
+	return slen;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: the value to set
+ * @size: the size of the value
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
+ * is permitted and only with privilege
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
+			     void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct task_smack *oldtsp;
+	struct cred *new;
+	char *newsmack;
+
+	/*
+	 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
+	 * and supports no sane use case.
+	 */
+	if (p != current)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
+	 */
+	if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	oldtsp = p->cred->security;
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (new == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (tsp == NULL) {
+		kfree(new);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	new->security = tsp;
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one sock
+ * @other: the other sock
+ * @newsk: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+				     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
+#endif
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+	/*
+	 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
+	 */
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
+		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+#endif
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @msg: the message
+ * @size: the size of the message
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
+ * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
+ * label host.
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				int size)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+
+	/*
+	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
+	 */
+	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
+		return 0;
+
+	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
+ * @sap: netlabel secattr
+ * @ssp: socket security information
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a Smack label found on the label list.
+ */
+static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+				struct socket_smack *ssp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	char *sp;
+	int pcat;
+
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
+		 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
+		 * behaving the way we expect it to.
+		 *
+		 * Get the categories, if any
+		 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+		 * for the packet fall back on the network
+		 * ambient value.
+		 */
+		memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+		if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
+			for (pcat = -1;;) {
+				pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
+					sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
+				if (pcat < 0)
+					break;
+				smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
+			}
+		/*
+		 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
+		 * we are already done. WeeHee.
+		 */
+		if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
+			/*
+			 * The label sent is usually on the label list.
+			 *
+			 * If it is not we may still want to allow the
+			 * delivery.
+			 *
+			 * If the recipient is accepting all packets
+			 * because it is using the star ("*") label
+			 * for SMACK64IPIN provide the web ("@") label
+			 * so that a directed response will succeed.
+			 * This is not very correct from a MAC point
+			 * of view, but gets around the problem that
+			 * locking prevents adding the newly discovered
+			 * label to the list.
+			 * The case where the recipient is not using
+			 * the star label should obviously fail.
+			 * The easy way to do this is to provide the
+			 * star label as the subject label.
+			 */
+			skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
+			if (skp != NULL)
+				return skp->smk_known;
+			if (ssp != NULL &&
+			    ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
+				return smack_known_web.smk_known;
+			return smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
+		 * a direct mapping.
+		 */
+		sp = smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack);
+		if (sp != NULL)
+			return sp;
+		if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
+			return smack_known_web.smk_known;
+		return smack_known_star.smk_known;
+	}
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+		 */
+		sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+		/*
+		 * This has got to be a bug because it is
+		 * impossible to specify a fallback without
+		 * specifying the label, which will ensure
+		 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
+		 * secid is from a fallback.
+		 */
+		BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
+		return sp;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+	 * for the packet fall back on the network
+	 * ambient value.
+	 */
+	return smack_net_ambient;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	char *csp;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+	 */
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		csp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+	else
+		csp = smack_net_ambient;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+	ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+	 * This is the simplist possible security model
+	 * for networking.
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @optval: user's destination
+ * @optlen: size thereof
+ * @len: max thereof
+ *
+ * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					  char __user *optval,
+					  int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	char *rcp = "";
+	int slen = 1;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
+		rcp = ssp->smk_packet;
+		slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
+	}
+
+	if (slen > len)
+		rc = -ERANGE;
+	else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+	if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
+	char *sp;
+	int family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	u32 s = 0;	/* 0 is the invalid secid */
+	int rc;
+
+	if (skb != NULL) {
+		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+			family = PF_INET;
+		else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+			family = PF_INET6;
+	}
+	if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
+		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+
+	if (family == PF_UNIX) {
+		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		s = smack_to_secid(ssp->smk_out);
+	} else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+		/*
+		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+		 */
+		if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
+			ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+			s = smack_to_secid(sp);
+		}
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	}
+	*secid = s;
+	if (s == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
+ * is creating the new socket.
+ */
+static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	if (sk == NULL ||
+	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
+		return;
+
+	ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
+	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
+ * @sk: socket involved
+ * @skb: packet
+ * @req: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
+ * the socket, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				   struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr;
+	struct iphdr *hdr;
+	char *sp;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+	else
+		sp = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+	ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
+	 * here. Read access is not required.
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(sp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
+	 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
+	 */
+	req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(sp);
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
+	 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
+	 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
+	 */
+	hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
+	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (smack_host_label(&addr) == NULL) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		smack_to_secattr(sp, &secattr);
+		rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	} else {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		netlbl_req_delattr(req);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
+ * @sk: the new socket
+ * @req: the connection's request_sock
+ *
+ * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
+ */
+static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+				 const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (req->peer_secid != 0)
+		ssp->smk_packet = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
+	else
+		ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key management security hooks
+ *
+ * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
+ * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
+ * If you care about keys please have a look.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
+ * @key: object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * No allocation required
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+			   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
+ * @key: the object
+ *
+ * Clear the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
+{
+	key->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
+ * @key_ref: gets to the object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @perm: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
+ * an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	struct key *keyp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+
+	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (keyp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
+	 * it may do so.
+	 */
+	if (keyp->security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * This should not occur
+	 */
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
+#endif
+	return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
+				 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+/*
+ * Smack Audit hooks
+ *
+ * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
+ * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
+ * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
+ * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
+ *
+ * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
+ * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
+ * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
+ * model where nearly everything is a label.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
+ * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
+ * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
+ * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
+ * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
+ *
+ * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
+ * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+	char **rule = (char **)vrule;
+	*rule = NULL;
+
+	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
+ * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
+ *
+ * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
+ * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
+ * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+	struct audit_field *f;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
+		f = &krule->fields[i];
+
+		if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
+ * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
+ * @op: required testing operator
+ * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
+ * @actx: audit context associated with the check
+ *
+ * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
+ * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+				  struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+	char *smack;
+	char *rule = vrule;
+
+	if (!rule) {
+		audit_log(actx, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+			  "Smack: missing rule\n");
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+		return 0;
+
+	smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
+	 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
+	 * label.
+	 */
+	if (op == Audit_equal)
+		return (rule == smack);
+	if (op == Audit_not_equal)
+		return (rule != smack);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
+ * @vrule: rule to be freed.
+ *
+ * No memory was allocated.
+ */
+static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+	/* No-op */
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+/**
+ * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
+ * @secid: incoming integer
+ * @secdata: destination
+ * @seclen: how long it is
+ *
+ * Exists for networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+	if (secdata)
+		*secdata = sp;
+	*seclen = strlen(sp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
+ * @secdata: smack label
+ * @seclen: how long result is
+ * @secid: outgoing integer
+ *
+ * Exists for audit and networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = smack_to_secid(secdata);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
+ * @secdata: unused
+ * @seclen: unused
+ *
+ * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
+ */
+static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	*ctxlen = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct security_operations smack_ops = {
+	.name =				"smack",
+
+	.ptrace_access_check =		smack_ptrace_access_check,
+	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
+	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,
+
+	.sb_alloc_security = 		smack_sb_alloc_security,
+	.sb_free_security = 		smack_sb_free_security,
+	.sb_copy_data = 		smack_sb_copy_data,
+	.sb_kern_mount = 		smack_sb_kern_mount,
+	.sb_statfs = 			smack_sb_statfs,
+	.sb_mount = 			smack_sb_mount,
+	.sb_umount = 			smack_sb_umount,
+
+	.bprm_set_creds =		smack_bprm_set_creds,
+	.bprm_committing_creds =	smack_bprm_committing_creds,
+	.bprm_secureexec =		smack_bprm_secureexec,
+
+	.inode_alloc_security = 	smack_inode_alloc_security,
+	.inode_free_security = 		smack_inode_free_security,
+	.inode_init_security = 		smack_inode_init_security,
+	.inode_link = 			smack_inode_link,
+	.inode_unlink = 		smack_inode_unlink,
+	.inode_rmdir = 			smack_inode_rmdir,
+	.inode_rename = 		smack_inode_rename,
+	.inode_permission = 		smack_inode_permission,
+	.inode_setattr = 		smack_inode_setattr,
+	.inode_getattr = 		smack_inode_getattr,
+	.inode_setxattr = 		smack_inode_setxattr,
+	.inode_post_setxattr = 		smack_inode_post_setxattr,
+	.inode_getxattr = 		smack_inode_getxattr,
+	.inode_removexattr = 		smack_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_getsecurity = 		smack_inode_getsecurity,
+	.inode_setsecurity = 		smack_inode_setsecurity,
+	.inode_listsecurity = 		smack_inode_listsecurity,
+	.inode_getsecid =		smack_inode_getsecid,
+
+	.file_permission = 		smack_file_permission,
+	.file_alloc_security = 		smack_file_alloc_security,
+	.file_free_security = 		smack_file_free_security,
+	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
+	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
+	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
+	.file_mmap =			smack_file_mmap,
+	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
+	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
+	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
+
+	.dentry_open =			smack_dentry_open,
+
+	.cred_alloc_blank =		smack_cred_alloc_blank,
+	.cred_free =			smack_cred_free,
+	.cred_prepare =			smack_cred_prepare,
+	.cred_transfer =		smack_cred_transfer,
+	.kernel_act_as =		smack_kernel_act_as,
+	.kernel_create_files_as =	smack_kernel_create_files_as,
+	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
+	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,
+	.task_getsid = 			smack_task_getsid,
+	.task_getsecid = 		smack_task_getsecid,
+	.task_setnice = 		smack_task_setnice,
+	.task_setioprio = 		smack_task_setioprio,
+	.task_getioprio = 		smack_task_getioprio,
+	.task_setscheduler = 		smack_task_setscheduler,
+	.task_getscheduler = 		smack_task_getscheduler,
+	.task_movememory = 		smack_task_movememory,
+	.task_kill = 			smack_task_kill,
+	.task_wait = 			smack_task_wait,
+	.task_to_inode = 		smack_task_to_inode,
+
+	.ipc_permission = 		smack_ipc_permission,
+	.ipc_getsecid =			smack_ipc_getsecid,
+
+	.msg_msg_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_free_security = 	smack_msg_msg_free_security,
+
+	.msg_queue_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
+	.msg_queue_free_security = 	smack_msg_queue_free_security,
+	.msg_queue_associate = 		smack_msg_queue_associate,
+	.msg_queue_msgctl = 		smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
+	.msg_queue_msgsnd = 		smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
+	.msg_queue_msgrcv = 		smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
+
+	.shm_alloc_security = 		smack_shm_alloc_security,
+	.shm_free_security = 		smack_shm_free_security,
+	.shm_associate = 		smack_shm_associate,
+	.shm_shmctl = 			smack_shm_shmctl,
+	.shm_shmat = 			smack_shm_shmat,
+
+	.sem_alloc_security = 		smack_sem_alloc_security,
+	.sem_free_security = 		smack_sem_free_security,
+	.sem_associate = 		smack_sem_associate,
+	.sem_semctl = 			smack_sem_semctl,
+	.sem_semop = 			smack_sem_semop,
+
+	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
+
+	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,
+	.setprocattr = 			smack_setprocattr,
+
+	.unix_stream_connect = 		smack_unix_stream_connect,
+	.unix_may_send = 		smack_unix_may_send,
+
+	.socket_post_create = 		smack_socket_post_create,
+	.socket_connect =		smack_socket_connect,
+	.socket_sendmsg =		smack_socket_sendmsg,
+	.socket_sock_rcv_skb = 		smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+	.sk_alloc_security = 		smack_sk_alloc_security,
+	.sk_free_security = 		smack_sk_free_security,
+	.sock_graft = 			smack_sock_graft,
+	.inet_conn_request = 		smack_inet_conn_request,
+	.inet_csk_clone =		smack_inet_csk_clone,
+
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.key_alloc = 			smack_key_alloc,
+	.key_free = 			smack_key_free,
+	.key_permission = 		smack_key_permission,
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+ /* Audit hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	.audit_rule_init =		smack_audit_rule_init,
+	.audit_rule_known =		smack_audit_rule_known,
+	.audit_rule_match =		smack_audit_rule_match,
+	.audit_rule_free =		smack_audit_rule_free,
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
+	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
+	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
+	.inode_notifysecctx =		smack_inode_notifysecctx,
+	.inode_setsecctx =		smack_inode_setsecctx,
+	.inode_getsecctx =		smack_inode_getsecctx,
+};
+
+
+static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Initialize CIPSO locks
+	 */
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_web.smk_cipsolock);
+	/*
+	 * Initialize rule list locks
+	 */
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
+	/*
+	 * Initialize rule lists
+	 */
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
+	/*
+	 * Create the known labels list
+	 */
+	list_add(&smack_known_huh.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_hat.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_star.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_floor.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_invalid.list, &smack_known_list);
+	list_add(&smack_known_web.list, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_init - initialize the smack system
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static __init int smack_init(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+		return 0;
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
+				smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Smack:  Initializing.\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
+	 */
+	cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
+	cred->security = tsp;
+
+	/* initialize the smack_known_list */
+	init_smack_known_list();
+
+	/*
+	 * Register with LSM
+	 */
+	if (register_security(&smack_ops))
+		panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
+ * all processes and objects when they are created.
+ */
+security_initcall(smack_init);
diff --git a/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smackfs.c b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smackfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..038811cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ANDROID_3.4.5/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1620 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * 	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * 	Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Special thanks to the authors of selinuxfs.
+ *
+ *	Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+/*
+ * smackfs pseudo filesystem.
+ */
+
+enum smk_inos {
+	SMK_ROOT_INO	= 2,
+	SMK_LOAD	= 3,	/* load policy */
+	SMK_CIPSO	= 4,	/* load label -> CIPSO mapping */
+	SMK_DOI		= 5,	/* CIPSO DOI */
+	SMK_DIRECT	= 6,	/* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
+	SMK_AMBIENT	= 7,	/* internet ambient label */
+	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
+	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
+	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
+	SMK_LOAD_SELF	= 11,	/* task specific rules */
+	SMK_ACCESSES	= 12,	/* access policy */
+};
+
+/*
+ * List locks
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+/*
+ * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
+ * If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
+ */
+char *smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+
+/*
+ * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
+ * smack label is contained directly in the category set.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
+ */
+int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
+ * Unless a process is running with this label even
+ * having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
+ * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no label is
+ * designated (the NULL case) capabilities apply to
+ * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label
+ * will be used if any label is used.
+ */
+char *smack_onlycap;
+
+/*
+ * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
+ * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
+ * can write to the specified label.
+ */
+
+LIST_HEAD(smk_netlbladdr_list);
+
+/*
+ * Rule lists are maintained for each label.
+ * This master list is just for reading /smack/load.
+ */
+struct smack_master_list {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct smack_rule	*smk_rule;
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
+
+static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
+
+const char *smack_cipso_option = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing cipso rules
+ * SMK_DIGITLEN: Length of a digit field in a rule.
+ * SMK_CIPSOMIN: Minimum possible cipso rule length.
+ * SMK_CIPSOMAX: Maximum possible cipso rule length.
+ */
+#define SMK_DIGITLEN 4
+#define SMK_CIPSOMIN (SMK_LABELLEN + 2 * SMK_DIGITLEN)
+#define SMK_CIPSOMAX (SMK_CIPSOMIN + SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM * SMK_DIGITLEN)
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing MAC rules
+ * SMK_ACCESS: Maximum possible combination of access permissions
+ * SMK_ACCESSLEN: Maximum length for a rule access field
+ * SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length
+ */
+#define SMK_OACCESS	"rwxa"
+#define SMK_ACCESS	"rwxat"
+#define SMK_OACCESSLEN	(sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_ACCESSLEN	(sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_OLOADLEN	(SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN)
+#define SMK_LOADLEN	(SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
+
+/**
+ * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
+ * @nap: structure to fill
+ */
+static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
+{
+	nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+	nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+	nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing single label host rules
+ * "1.2.3.4 X"
+ * "192.168.138.129/32 abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw"
+ */
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN	9
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX	42
+
+/**
+ * smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list
+ * @srp: the new rule to add
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules
+ * @rule_lock: the rule list lock
+ *
+ * Looks through the current subject/object/access list for
+ * the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was
+ * there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified
+ * access.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if a rule was found to exist already, 0 if it is new
+ * Returns 0 if nothing goes wrong or -ENOMEM if it fails
+ * during the allocation of the new pair to add.
+ */
+static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
+				struct mutex *rule_lock)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *sp;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Because the object label is less likely to match
+	 * than the subject label check it first
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) {
+		if (sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object &&
+		    sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject) {
+			found = 1;
+			sp->smk_access = srp->smk_access;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (found == 0)
+		list_add_rcu(&srp->list, rule_list);
+
+	mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_rule - parse Smack rule from load string
+ * @data: string to be parsed whose size is SMK_LOADLEN
+ * @rule: Smack rule
+ * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ */
+static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, int import)
+{
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if (import) {
+		rule->smk_subject = smk_import(data, 0);
+		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
+			return -1;
+
+		rule->smk_object = smk_import(data + SMK_LABELLEN, 0);
+		if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
+			return -1;
+	} else {
+		smk_parse_smack(data, 0, smack);
+		skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
+
+		smk_parse_smack(data + SMK_LABELLEN, 0, smack);
+		skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		rule->smk_object = skp->smk_known;
+	}
+
+	rule->smk_access = 0;
+
+	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN]) {
+	case '-':
+		break;
+	case 'r':
+	case 'R':
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 1]) {
+	case '-':
+		break;
+	case 'w':
+	case 'W':
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_WRITE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 2]) {
+	case '-':
+		break;
+	case 'x':
+	case 'X':
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_EXEC;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 3]) {
+	case '-':
+		break;
+	case 'a':
+	case 'A':
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_APPEND;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 4]) {
+	case '-':
+		break;
+	case 't':
+	case 'T':
+		rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_list - write() for any /smack/load
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to write to
+ * @rule_lock: lock for the rule list
+ *
+ * Get one smack access rule from above.
+ * The format is exactly:
+ *     char subject[SMK_LABELLEN]
+ *     char object[SMK_LABELLEN]
+ *     char access[SMK_ACCESSLEN]
+ *
+ * writes must be SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_ACCESSLEN bytes.
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+				struct list_head *rule_list,
+				struct mutex *rule_lock)
+{
+	struct smack_master_list *smlp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_rule *rule;
+	char *data;
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+	int load = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * Minor hack for backward compatibility
+	 */
+	if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = kzalloc(SMK_LOADLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * More on the minor hack for backward compatibility
+	 */
+	if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN))
+		data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-';
+
+	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rule == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (smk_parse_rule(data, rule, 1))
+		goto out_free_rule;
+
+	if (rule_list == NULL) {
+		load = 1;
+		skp = smk_find_entry(rule->smk_subject);
+		rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
+		rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
+	}
+
+	rc = count;
+	/*
+	 * If this is "load" as opposed to "load-self" and a new rule
+	 * it needs to get added for reporting.
+	 * smk_set_access returns true if there was already a rule
+	 * for the subject/object pair, and false if it was new.
+	 */
+	if (load && !smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock)) {
+		smlp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smlp), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (smlp != NULL) {
+			smlp->smk_rule = rule;
+			list_add_rcu(&smlp->list, &smack_rule_list);
+		} else
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+out_free_rule:
+	kfree(rule);
+out:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Core logic for smackfs seq list operations.
+ */
+
+static void *smk_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos,
+				struct list_head *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *list;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is 0 the first time through.
+	 */
+	if (s->index == 0)
+		s->private = head;
+
+	if (s->private == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	list = s->private;
+	if (list_empty(list))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (s->index == 0)
+		return list->next;
+	return list;
+}
+
+static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos,
+				struct list_head *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+
+	if (list_is_last(list, head)) {
+		s->private = NULL;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	s->private = list->next;
+	return list->next;
+}
+
+static void smk_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	/* No-op */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
+ */
+
+static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_rule_list);
+}
+
+static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_rule_list);
+}
+
+static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_master_list *smlp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
+	struct smack_rule *srp = smlp->smk_rule;
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+		seq_putc(s, 'r');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+		seq_putc(s, 'w');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+		seq_putc(s, 'x');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+		seq_putc(s, 'a');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		seq_putc(s, 't');
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_cipso_doi - initialize the CIPSO domain
+ */
+static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct cipso_v4_doi *doip;
+	struct netlbl_audit nai;
+
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
+
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+
+	doip = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cipso_v4_doi), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (doip == NULL)
+		panic("smack:  Failed to initialize cipso DOI.\n");
+	doip->map.std = NULL;
+	doip->doi = smk_cipso_doi_value;
+	doip->type = CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS;
+	doip->tags[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP;
+	for (rc = 1; rc < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; rc++)
+		doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
+
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(doip, &nai);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d cipso add rc = %d\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+		kfree(doip);
+		return;
+	}
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(doip->doi, NULL, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d map add rc = %d\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+		kfree(doip);
+		return;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_unlbl_ambient - initialize the unlabeled domain
+ * @oldambient: previous domain string
+ */
+static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_audit nai;
+
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
+
+	if (oldambient != NULL) {
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
+			       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
+				      NULL, NULL, &nai);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
+		       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/cipso
+ */
+
+static void *cipso_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+static void *cipso_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print cipso labels in format:
+ * label level[/cat[,cat]]
+ */
+static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head  *list = v;
+	struct smack_known *skp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
+	struct smack_cipso *scp = skp->smk_cipso;
+	char *cbp;
+	char sep = '/';
+	int cat = 1;
+	int i;
+	unsigned char m;
+
+	if (scp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %3d", (char *)&skp->smk_known, scp->smk_level);
+
+	cbp = scp->smk_catset;
+	for (i = 0; i < SMK_LABELLEN; i++)
+		for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1) {
+			if (m & cbp[i]) {
+				seq_printf(s, "%c%d", sep, cat);
+				sep = ',';
+			}
+			cat++;
+		}
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations cipso_seq_ops = {
+	.start = cipso_seq_start,
+	.next  = cipso_seq_next,
+	.show  = cipso_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_cipso - open() for /smack/cipso
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "cipso" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our cipso_seq_* operations with /smack/cipso
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_cipso(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &cipso_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_cipso - write() for /smack/cipso
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one cipso rule per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_cipso *scp = NULL;
+	char mapcatset[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	int maplevel;
+	int cat;
+	int catlen;
+	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+	char *data = NULL;
+	char *rule;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count < SMK_CIPSOMIN || count > SMK_CIPSOMAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto unlockedout;
+	}
+
+	/* labels cannot begin with a '-' */
+	if (data[0] == '-') {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto unlockedout;
+	}
+	data[count] = '\0';
+	rule = data;
+	/*
+	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+	 * quite rare and small in any case.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smack_cipso_lock);
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(rule, 0);
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
+	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
+	if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
+		goto out;
+
+	rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &catlen);
+	if (ret != 1 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))
+		goto out;
+
+	memset(mapcatset, 0, sizeof(mapcatset));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) {
+		rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+		ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &cat);
+		if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATVAL)
+			goto out;
+
+		smack_catset_bit(cat, mapcatset);
+	}
+
+	if (skp->smk_cipso == NULL) {
+		scp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_cipso), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (scp == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
+
+	if (scp == NULL)
+		scp = skp->smk_cipso;
+	else
+		skp->smk_cipso = scp;
+
+	scp->smk_level = maplevel;
+	memcpy(scp->smk_catset, mapcatset, sizeof(mapcatset));
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
+
+	rc = count;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_cipso_lock);
+unlockedout:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_cipso_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_cipso,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_cipso,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
+ */
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+}
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+}
+#define BEBITS	(sizeof(__be32) * 8)
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp =
+			 list_entry(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+	unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	int maskn;
+	u32 temp_mask = be32_to_cpu(skp->smk_mask.s_addr);
+
+	for (maskn = 0; temp_mask; temp_mask <<= 1, maskn++);
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%u.%u.%u.%u/%d %s\n",
+		hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
+	.start = netlbladdr_seq_start,
+	.next  = netlbladdr_seq_next,
+	.show  = netlbladdr_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_netlbladdr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our netlbladdr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_netlbladdr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &netlbladdr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_netlbladdr_insert
+ * @new : netlabel to insert
+ *
+ * This helper insert netlabel in the smack_netlbladdrs list
+ * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_netlbladdr_lock in smk_write_netlbladdr
+ *
+ */
+static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *m, *m_next;
+
+	if (list_empty(&smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	m = list_entry_rcu(smk_netlbladdr_list.next,
+			   struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+
+	/* the comparison '>' is a bit hacky, but works */
+	if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m->smk_mask.s_addr) {
+		list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
+		if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_netlbladdr_list)) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+		m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
+					struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+		if (new->smk_mask.s_addr > m_next->smk_mask.s_addr) {
+			list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one netlbladdr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp;
+	struct sockaddr_in newname;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	char *sp;
+	char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX + 1];
+	char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct in_addr mask;
+	unsigned int m;
+	int found;
+	u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
+	__be32 nsa;
+	u32 temp_mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
+	 * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
+	 */
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data[count] = '\0';
+
+	rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%d %s",
+		&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
+	if (rc != 6) {
+		rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
+			&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
+		if (rc != 5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		m = BEBITS;
+	}
+	if (m > BEBITS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* if smack begins with '-', its an option, don't import it */
+	if (smack[0] != '-') {
+		sp = smk_import(smack, 0);
+		if (sp == NULL)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		/* check known options */
+		if (strcmp(smack, smack_cipso_option) == 0)
+			sp = (char *)smack_cipso_option;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+		temp_mask |= mask_bits;
+		mask_bits >>= 1;
+	}
+	mask.s_addr = cpu_to_be32(temp_mask);
+
+	newname.sin_addr.s_addr &= mask.s_addr;
+	/*
+	 * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+	 * quite rare and small in any case.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+	nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	/* try to find if the prefix is already in the list */
+	found = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
+		if (skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
+		    skp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
+
+	if (found == 0) {
+		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+		else {
+			rc = 0;
+			skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+			skp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
+			skp->smk_label = sp;
+			smk_netlbladdr_insert(skp);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
+		 * wasn't the special CIPSO option */
+		if (skp->smk_label != smack_cipso_option)
+			rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
+					&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
+					PF_INET, &audit_info);
+		else
+			rc = 0;
+		skp->smk_label = sp;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now tell netlabel about the single label nature of
+	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
+	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
+	 */
+	if (rc == 0 && sp != smack_cipso_option)
+		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
+			&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+			smack_to_secid(skp->smk_label), &audit_info);
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = count;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_netlbladdr_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_netlbladdr,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_netlbladdr,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_doi(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", smk_cipso_doi_value);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_doi - write() for /smack/doi
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	smk_cipso_doi_value = i;
+
+	smk_cipso_doi();
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_doi_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_doi,
+	.write		= smk_write_doi,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_direct - read() for /smack/direct
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_direct(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", smack_cipso_direct);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_direct - write() for /smack/direct
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	smack_cipso_direct = i;
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_direct_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_direct,
+	.write		= smk_write_direct,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_ambient - read() for /smack/ambient
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t rc;
+	int asize;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Being careful to avoid a problem in the case where
+	 * smack_net_ambient gets changed in midstream.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+	asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient) + 1;
+
+	if (cn >= asize)
+		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos,
+					     smack_net_ambient, asize);
+	else
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ambient - write() for /smack/ambient
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	char *oldambient;
+	char *smack;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(in, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	smack = smk_import(in, count);
+	if (smack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+	oldambient = smack_net_ambient;
+	smack_net_ambient = smack;
+	smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_ambient,
+	.write		= smk_write_ambient,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_onlycap - read() for /smack/onlycap
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *smack = "";
+	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+	int asize;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_onlycap != NULL)
+		smack = smack_onlycap;
+
+	asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+
+	if (cn >= asize)
+		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_onlycap - write() for /smack/onlycap
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * This can be done using smk_access() but is done
+	 * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
+	 * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
+	 */
+	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(in, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Should the null string be passed in unset the onlycap value.
+	 * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
+	 * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
+	 * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
+	 * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
+	 */
+	smack_onlycap = smk_import(in, count);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_onlycap,
+	.write		= smk_write_onlycap,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_logging(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d\n", log_policy);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_logging - write() for /smack/logging
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (i < 0 || i > 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	log_policy = i;
+	return count;
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_logging,
+	.write		= smk_write_logging,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self
+ */
+
+static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+		seq_putc(s, 'r');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+		seq_putc(s, 'w');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+		seq_putc(s, 'x');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+		seq_putc(s, 'a');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		seq_putc(s, 't');
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_self_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_self_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_self_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self - open() for /smack/load-self
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self - write() for /smack/load-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+					&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load_self,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load_self,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_access - handle access check transaction
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_rule rule;
+	char *data;
+	int res;
+
+	data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	if (count < SMK_LOADLEN || smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, rule.smk_access,
+			  NULL);
+	data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0';
+	data[1] = '\0';
+
+	simple_transaction_set(file, 2);
+	return SMK_LOADLEN;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_access_ops = {
+	.write		= smk_write_access,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
+ * @sb: the empty superblock
+ * @data: unused
+ * @silent: unused
+ *
+ * Fill in the well known entries for /smack
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct inode *root_inode;
+
+	static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
+		[SMK_LOAD] = {
+			"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_CIPSO] = {
+			"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DOI] = {
+			"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DIRECT] = {
+			"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_AMBIENT] = {
+			"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_NETLBLADDR] = {
+			"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
+			"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOGGING] = {
+			"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
+			"load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SMK_ACCESSES] = {
+			"access", &smk_access_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		/* last one */
+			{""}
+	};
+
+	rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s failed %d while creating inodes\n",
+			__func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
+	root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_mount - get the smackfs superblock
+ * @fs_type: passed along without comment
+ * @flags: passed along without comment
+ * @dev_name: passed along without comment
+ * @data: passed along without comment
+ *
+ * Just passes everything along.
+ *
+ * Returns what the lower level code does.
+ */
+static struct dentry *smk_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+		      int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
+{
+	return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, smk_fill_super);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type smk_fs_type = {
+	.name		= "smackfs",
+	.mount		= smk_mount,
+	.kill_sb	= kill_litter_super,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;
+
+/**
+ * init_smk_fs - get the smackfs superblock
+ *
+ * register the smackfs
+ *
+ * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled
+ * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the
+ * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get
+ * initialized before the vfs caches.
+ *
+ * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if
+ * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded.
+ */
+static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+		return 0;
+
+	err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
+	if (!err) {
+		smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);
+		if (IS_ERR(smackfs_mount)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs:  could not mount!\n");
+			err = PTR_ERR(smackfs_mount);
+			smackfs_mount = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	smk_cipso_doi();
+	smk_unlbl_ambient(NULL);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(init_smk_fs);